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SUMMARY

Earlier in this study, I explored the disaster literature and pinpointed the
contributions made by previous disaster studies and emphasized the gap in the disaster
literature regarding the determinants of organizational preparedness and mitigation. My
exploration revealed that there is no theory to guide research on the determinants of
preparedness and mitigation at the organizational level of analysis. Knowledge of these
determinants can help to understand the factors that are instrumental in motivating
organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. This study attempts to
narrow this gap by studying the determinants of organizational preparedness and
mitigation for disasters among Memphis/Shelby County organizations.
The main goal of this study is to answer the question “what are the determinants
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” The following four subquestions provide good basis for exploring this question. (i) Does concern over disaster
impact lead to more mitigation and preparedness? (ii) What is the relationship between
mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles? (iii) Do single location
organizations engage in less mitigation and preparedness than other types of
organizations? (iv) Does organizational size have a positive effect on mitigation and
preparedness? In order to answer the question regarding the determinants of mitigation
and preparedness in organizations, this study utilizes four independent variables - concern
over disaster impacts, organizational obstacles, ownership patterns of organizations, and
organizational size. In addition, this study includes three variables as controls for
organizational sector: education, health, and wholesale/retail trade.

x

This study uses Tobit regression technique to identify the determinants of
mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level of analysis. Tobit is appropriate
because of the censored nature of the dependent variable: Left-censored at zero and rightcensored at 10.
The main findings of this study are: (1) Organizational size is a strong positive
determinant of mitigation and preparedness in organizations. Larger organizations in
Memphis/Shelby County are more likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness
activities compared to smaller organizations. (2) Concern over disaster impact is also a
strong positive determinant of mitigation and preparedness in organizations.
Organizations that are worried about the impact of disasters on their organizations are
more likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness activities than organizations that are
not. (3) There is a non-linear relationship between organizational obstacle and mitigation
and preparedness activities. The coefficients on organizational obstacle and
organizational obstacle2 show that there is a positive association between mitigation and
preparedness and organizational obstacles until organizational obstacle peaks and then
the association becomes negative.
The policy implications of this study are as follows: (1) The strong positive
relationship between concern over disaster impact and engagement in mitigation and
preparedness activities suggests that computer programs capable of estimating different
type of disaster losses, such as loss of life and property may be able to motivate
Memphis/Shelby County organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness activities.
This result suggests that properly designed and implemented programs, which are capable
of showing organizations the type and extent of losses they stand to incur if a disaster

xi

occurs might be effective in stimulating organizations to adopt mitigation and
preparedness measures. (2) The significant positive relationship between organizational
size and mitigation and preparedness, suggests that governments at all levels should
regard small businesses as a special group that may need specific incentives to make
them adopt more mitigation and preparedness activities.

xii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

This study defines disasters as events, such as floods or earthquakes, which lead
to major organizational disruption, loss of life, or property destruction. The consequences
of disasters include but not limited to deaths, loss of properties, and disruption in business
activities. The colossal nature of disaster-induced losses is, indeed, worrisome and
evidence from government agencies, insurance community, and the disaster literature
suggest continued increases in disaster losses (e.g., Munich Reinsurance Group, 2008). In
light of potential future increases in the number of disasters and consequently, disaster
losses, there is need to study ways of stemming disaster losses. Although, it is impossible
to change the magnitude and frequency of disasters, engaging in mitigation and
preparedness activities can help to ameliorate disaster impacts or consequences. In this
study, mitigation activities include securing computers and strengthening parts of a
building, while preparedness activities include attending disaster meeting/training courses
and arranging site visit by consultants to better prepare for disasters.
A number of disaster researchers have established the determinants of
preparedness and mitigation at the household level of analysis. According to this
literature, adoption of mitigation and preparedness measures depend among other factors
on family size, education, previous experience with disaster, gender, and income.
However, at the organizational level, there is limited research on the determinants of
preparedness and mitigation.
Many large-n quantitative studies in the disaster management literature have
focused on levels other than the organization, such as household and community. In
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between households and communities are organizations, which disaster researchers have
largely neglected (Tierney, 1997; Webb et al., 2000). In this study, the unit of analysis is
the organization because they are an important decision-making unit in the community
and undoubtedly a significant contributor to the United States economy, and in particular,
to the Memphis/Shelby County economy. For instance, small businesses alone provide
more than fifty percent of the total employment in the United States (Alesch et al., 2001).
One of the fundamental goals of organizations is survival (Shafritz et al., 2005).
Disasters constantly threaten this goal by causing organizational disruption and
undermining the economy of communities (Lindell & Perry, 2007). The challenge for
organizations is to find ways of ensuring continuity during and after disasters.
Organizations stand a better chance of surviving disasters if they have preparedness and
mitigation strategies in place before disasters strike (McManus & Carr, 2001). These
measures can make it easier for organizations to protect the lives of their personnel and
properties as well as help their communities to prepare for and mitigate disasters. The
organizations examined in the study are public agencies, nonprofit groups, and private
enterprises at risk of major disasters or those involved in seismic risk issues. They
include but not limited to utility companies, schools, health facilities, chemical
companies, financial institutions, religious institutions, transportation, and restaurants.
Disaster researchers have studied how organizations are preparing for and
mitigating disasters in high seismic regions of the United States, especially California.
Unfortunately, only a few disaster studies have examined how organizations are
preparing for and mitigating disaster risks in a moderate seismic region like the New
Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ). Evidence in the disaster literature suggests that
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organizations in the NMSZ are not prepared for disasters. This study focuses on
Memphis/Shelby County because of its high population (Shelby County is ranked 44 out
of 3141 counties in the United States in 2000 (United States Census Bureau, 2001),
proximity to the New Madrid Fault Zone, and low level of organization preparedness for
disasters (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Webb et al., 2000). These three conditions could
make it possible for a moderate earthquake to cause substantial damage to organizations
in Memphis/Shelby County. In addition, these conditions make Memphis/Shelby County
an interesting case to study.
This study is important to disaster researchers and the emergency management
community in the following ways: First, it is essential to know the factors that make an
organization want to prepare for and mitigate disasters. Knowledge of such factors can
contribute to the development of appropriate theories and provide a solid basis on which
to institute disaster policies. Second, this study looks at how organizations are preparing
for and mitigating different types of disasters in the NMSZ. Third, this study may be of
practical use to the emergency management community, especially those in Memphis
because it provides hard-to-find information on Memphis/Shelby County organizations’
perceived actions regarding risks. Observations from preliminary interviews of
Memphis/Shelby County organizations suggests that such rare information would be vital
to the Memphis/Shelby County Emergency Management Agency’s (EMA) plan to
improve how organizations prepare for and mitigate disasters. Fourth, this study helps the
Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center, Center for Earthquake Research and
Information (CERI), Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC), and other
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earthquake organizations by putting earthquakes into the broader context of other hazards
in organizational decision-making.
This research question of interest in this study is “what are the determinants of
mitigation and preparedness in organizations?" Only by identifying these factors will
policymakers be able to make appropriate policies to stem disaster losses in
organizations. The following four sub-questions provide good basis for exploring the
research question. (i) Does concern over disaster impact lead to more mitigation and
preparedness? (ii) What is the relationship between mitigation and preparedness and
organizational obstacles? (iii) Do single location organizations engage in less mitigation
and preparedness than other types of organizations? (iv) Does organizational size have a
positive effect on mitigation and preparedness? In addition to this main research
question, I explored these three questions. (i) Which disasters are organizations worried
about? (ii) Which mitigation and preparedness activities do organizations typically
engage in? (iii) Do organizations use disaster information in decision-making? The
current study is pre-event, that is it examines what organizations are doing to mitigate
and prepare for disasters before disasters strike. Knowing what organizations are doing
can help policymakers know where organizations are vis-à-vis mitigation and
preparedness and be able to devise necessary mitigation and preparedness policies to take
organizations to where they want them to be.
Chapter II begins by discussing the controversies surrounding the definition of
disaster and enumerates some examples of past disasters and their estimated losses. Then
it presents a review of disaster research at the organizational level and an overview of
emergency management in the United States. Next, it discusses the importance of
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organizational survival, the determinants of mitigation and preparedness, and
organizational obstacles. The chapter concludes with background information on
Memphis.
Chapter III presents the methodology use in this study. It begins with the
procedure for data collection and the strengths and limitations of the data. Then it
presents a model of organizational mitigation and preparedness, the dependent and
independent variables, the hypotheses to be tested, and the estimation techniques. Chapter
III concludes with an outline of the Heckman approach to sample selection and a brief
discussion of sample representativeness.
Chapter IV presents the results of the descriptive and quantitative analyses. This
chapter begins with a description of individual respondents. Next, it answers three
questions: (i) Which disasters are organizations worried about? (ii) What mitigation and
preparedness activities do organizations typically engage in? (iii) Do organizations use
disaster information in decision-making? Then, it presents the results of the bivariate
analysis and the Tobit regression, which answers the question “what are the determinants
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” Chapter IV concludes by
discussing the results of the Heckman approach, the specification tests and results of
other additional analyses.
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations of this study. It begins
by reiterating the research questions and summarizing the results. Next, it discusses the
findings in the context of previous research and examines the policy implications of the
results. Chapter V ends by discussing some limitations and recommendations for future
research.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter begins by discussing the controversies surrounding the definition of
disaster and enumerates some examples of past disasters and their estimated losses. Then
it presents a review of disaster research at the organizational level and an overview of
emergency management in the United States. Next, it discusses the importance of
organizational survival, the determinants of mitigation and preparedness, and
organizational obstacles. The chapter concludes with background information on
Memphis.

Disaster: A Controversial Concept
The word “disaster” is a complicated (Quarantelli, 1985) and vague (Kreps, 1984,
1985) concept. Establishing a clear conceptualization of an issue is important for public
policy (Dynes & Drabek, 1994). For example, a clear understanding of the word disaster
can provide guidance on proper classification of particular historical events as disasters
(Kreps, 1985). Proper categorization is vital in policymaking, such as in disaster
declarations and dispatching resources for response and recovery. Similarly, in
organizations, an unambiguous understanding of the definition of disasters has
implications for decision-making. For instance, having a clear understanding of what
constitutes disaster would enable organizations to know the appropriate mitigation and
preparedness measures to adopt, e.g., whether or not to tie down business equipment. In
addition, it is important to have a good definition of disasters in order to improve data
gathering and analysis (Quarantelli, 2003), be able to generalize the findings of disaster
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research (Stallings, 2006), and advance theoretical understanding of disaster research
(Quarantelli, 1985, 2003). The need for a clear conceptualization and definition of
disaster is important in the disaster management literature that disaster researchers have
spent much time on defining this concept (e.g., Kreps, 1984, 1985; Quarantelli, 1985,
1987; Auf der Heide, 1989; Mileti, 1999; Perry, 2006; Gerber, 2007). Furthermore, the
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters devoted an issue to discussing
disasters in 1995 (Mileti, 1999). The question-what is a disaster?-Has received much
attention from disaster researchers, especially after the publication of Quarantelli’s
(1987) presidential address to the International Research Committee on Disasters. Before
then, disaster researchers have generally avoided this topic (Quarantelli, 1985). Despite
the attention and avoidance, there is no consensus on its definition and conceptualization
(Quarantelli, 1985, 1987), to the extent that Quarantelli (1987) stated that disaster
research might be at the threshold of a possible paradigmatic revolution. The following
paragraph discusses some definitions of disasters to highlight the differences in meaning
and conceptualization.
According to Perry (2006), one can trace early definition of disaster to the work
of Carr (1932). Carr defines disaster as the “collapse of cultural protections” (Carr, 1932
p 211). This perspective sees disasters as a negative consequence event, a view still in
existence today (Perry, 2006). Fritz defines disasters as “…an event, concentrated in time
and space, in which a society or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society,
undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical
appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of
essential function of the society is prevented.” Cited in Quarantelli (1987 p 655).
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According to Mileti (1999), most people agreed with Fritz’s definition of disasters until
recently when opinion began to diverge. The deviation has led to other definitions of
disasters. For instance, Quarantelli (1985) views a disaster as an event in which the
demand for action exceeds the capacity to respond. This perspective treats disasters as
social “occasions” (Quarantelli, 1985 p 50). Nigg (1996) argues that social scientists
define disaster based on social disruption and not on physical characteristics. She sees
disasters occurring only “when the built and social environments are so disrupted that the
resources of the social system are overwhelmed and the system is unable to meet the
demands placed on it for goods and services that are routinely expected by its citizens”
(Nigg, 1996 p 5). As a way forward, Quarantelli (1987) notes, among other suggestions,
that having consensus on one definition of disaster is not important; clarity of the term
and what the term refers to when the word is used are what is important. In the same vein,
Perry (2006) recommends having a classification system that the disaster community can
scrutinize with the goal of attaining some consensus (Perry, 2006).
My goal is neither to provide a final definition and conceptualization of this
controversial word, nor to settle conceptual disagreements. Rather, the goal is to
recognize the complexities and controversies surrounding the word and acknowledge the
commendable efforts of disaster researchers on this topic. Recall that this study defines
disasters as events, such as floods or earthquakes, which lead to major organizational
disruption, loss of life, or property destruction. There are two important things to note
about this definition. First, it emphasizes the unit of analysis, the organization. By
incorporating the level of analysis in the definition of disaster, this study establishes a
common context for respondent organizations. Second, this definition emphasizes
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property damage and number of injured and fatalities in accordance to some definitions
in the disaster literature (e.g., Kreps, 1984; Rotanz, 2007). Incorporating these
components- property damage and number of injured and fatalities are a useful way of
defining disasters to the target audience, the Memphis/Shelby County organizational
representatives. Although, some disaster researchers disagree on the basis that using
property damage and number of casualties and injured as criteria for defining disaster
may be misleading (e.g., Auf der Heide, 1989).

Disasters as “Acts of God” or “Acts of Men”
There is a literature on disasters that focuses on the distinctions between natural
and man-made/technological disasters (e.g., Quarantelli, 1987; Dynes & Drabek, 1994).
Quarantelli (1987) provides a good historical account of disasters and traces the sources
of disasters-to the stars, God, nature, men and women, and to society. The initial
understanding of disasters was that they are “acts of God” (Dynes & Drabek, 1994 p 6).
The occurrence of myriad natural disasters prompted many communities to see
industrialization and technological advancements as solutions to the problems created by
disasters (ibid). For instance, communities built dams to address flooding caused by
natural systems. Unfortunately, technological solutions led to increased development and
subsequently more disasters (ibid). This led to the realization that disasters may be
“natural or technological” (Dynes & Drabek, 1994 p 7) / “acts of men” (Quarantelli, 1987
p 9).
I do not distinguish between natural or technological/man-made disasters because
this study is about the determinants of mitigation and preparedness not about the causes
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of disasters. Although, some may argue that the causes of disasters can affect how
organizations mitigate and prepare for them. In other words, some organizations may
mitigate differently depending on whether a disaster is natural or man-made. This study
assumes that the distinction between natural and man-made disasters is not relevant in
understanding the determinants of mitigation and preparedness.

Expected Losses from Disasters
Researchers have documented the pernicious nature of disasters (e.g., Auf de
Heide, 1989). The following examples highlight the monumental losses that can result
from disasters. The Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 caused 62 deaths, injured 3,757
people, displaced over 20,000 people, destroyed 18,306 homes and businesses, and
caused over 6 billion dollars in economic losses (Mileti & O’Brien, 1992). The
September 11 terrorist attacks caused 2973 fatalities (The 9/11 Commission Report,
2004). The estimate of economic losses from Hurricane Katrina is over $200 billion
(Burby, 2006). The Midwest floods of June 2008 caused 24 fatalities, injuries to 150
people, destroyed 40,000 properties and 5 million acres of agricultural land (Munich
Reinsurance Group, 2008). While these costs vary by year, a new study by FEMA in
2006 indicates that the Annual Estimated Losses (AEL) to the national building stock is
$5.3 billion (FEMA, 2007). In the first six months of 2008, the United States has suffered
154 fatalities and about $20.3 billion in estimated total losses to disasters (Munich
Reinsurance Group, 2008). Evidence from the disaster literature (e.g., Mileti, 1999;
Waugh, 2000) and the insurance community (e.g., Munich Reinsurance Group, 2008)
suggest continued increases in losses from disasters. The reasons for the expected
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increases include but not limited to rising population density, more settlements in highrisk areas, and increases in technological risks (Auf der Heide, 1989).

Disaster Research at the Organizational Level: The Need for More
Extensive and systematic disaster research began in the early 1950s (Quarantelli,
2003). The focus then was on how individuals, households, communities, and public
organizations like fire and police departments responded in the aftermath of disasters
(Tierney, 1997). The field of disaster research has expanded since then, with increased
growth in research at the individual, household, community, and public sector
organizational levels (Tierney, 1997; Webb et al., 2000). In fact, many studies in the
disaster management literature focus either on household surveys (e.g., Jackson, 1981;
Davis, 1989; Dooley et al., 1992; Edwards, 1993; Farley, 1998; Atwood & Major, 2000)
or on surveys of policy elite active in a community (e.g., Drabek et al., 1983; Mushkatel
& Nigg, 1987; Berke & Beatley, 1992; May & Birkland, 1994; Burby et al., 2000; Wood,
2004). Unfortunately, disaster researchers have largely neglected the organizational level
(Tierney, 1997; Webb et al., 2000).
Tierney (1997) points out that in the last five years, notable disaster journals and
crisis management journals have few articles on organizations and disasters. The few
available articles focused on how public-sector organizations are dealing with a particular
disaster and not on how the disaster affected businesses (ibid). The emergence of some
journals (e.g., Disaster Recovery and Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management),
provides hope for more disaster research on organizations. While these journals are
replete with useful information on disasters, many of their articles do not contain

11

information on the determinants of organizational preparedness (Dahlhamer & D’Souza,
1997) and many focus on single case studies and not on large-scale systematic research
(Tierney, 1997). Single cases are not appropriate for generalizing findings from disaster
research (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). The field of organizations has the potential of
providing information on businesses and disasters. However, according to Tierney (1997)
much of this literature deals with how to manage complex systems. Although, this
literature is quite useful, its focuses on rare catastrophic events (e.g. Perrow, 1984), thus
making it difficult to generalize findings to typical organizations. The neglect of disaster
research at the organizational level may be because organizations are difficult to sample
and survey in large numbers; the theoretical lines of inquiry usually direct research
activities toward disaster awareness and response among regular citizen or among
decision makers; and, some organizations are afraid of the potential consequences of
divulging disaster information (Auf der Heide, 1989).
There is a body of disaster research at the business/organizational level on disaster
recovery (e.g., Durkin, 1984; Kroll et al., 1991; Tierney et al., 1996; Dahlhamer &
Tierney, 1998; Alesch et al., 2001). Some of these post-disaster studies have examined
how disasters affect businesses in the short-term (e.g., Dahlhamer, 1998; Dahlhamer &
Tierney, 1998) or the longer-term (e.g., W ebb et al., 1999). Others have studied
programs aimed at helping businesses in disasters, such as the Small Business
Administration loan (e.g., French et al., 1984; Dahlhamer, 1992). This federal loan
provides financial assistance to small businesses affected by disasters. These studies are
useful for providing insights into why some organizations survive and others do not.
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Unfortunately, they cannot tell us about the determinants of mitigation and preparedness
at the organizational level.
A body of pre-disaster research at the organizational level is beginning to emerge
due to the foundational work of some eminent researchers like Quarantelli, Lawrence,
Tierney and Johnson. This group of researchers examined how chemical companies and
government agencies in 18 U.S. communities plan for chemical emergencies (Quarantelli
et al., 1979). A few years later Drabek (1991, 1994a, 1994b) investigated how businesses
in the tourism industry carry out evacuation planning. Mileti et al. (1993) studied how 54
businesses in eight San Francisco counties adopt earthquake preparedness measures.
Further, Barlow (1993) investigated the impact of Iben Browning earthquake prediction
on 20 businesses in the St. Louis area. Dahlhamer & D’ Souza (1997) investigated the
determinants of business disaster preparedness in Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee
and Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa. Webb et al. (2000) used a series of surveys to
explore the preparedness and disaster experiences of businesses in different parts of the
country, including Memphis, Tennessee. Aside from the Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997)
and the Webb et al. (2000) studies, no other disaster study in Memphis used systematic
method of data collection to gather disaster information from typical organizations of
various sizes representing different industries.

Overview of the United States Emergency Management System
In this section, I take a brief look at the history, phases, and the status quo of
emergency management, especially the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on emergency
management in the United States. The United States emergency management system
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developed in response to particular disasters with no capacity building to address the next
disaster (Waugh, 2000). Since fire and flood have been the most common disasters in the
United States, these disasters are the basis of the national emergency management system
policies (ibid).
Before the 1900s, there were no organized responses to disasters; when disasters
occur, individuals simply carried out response activities themselves, or sometimes with
the help of family members and neighbors (Rubin, 2007). Volunteer fire brigades and
people close to fire outbreaks battled fires using buckets and shovels (Waugh, 2000;
Rubin, 2007). With more fire outbreaks, the number of volunteers available and the level
of expertise became inadequate thus, leading to the establishment of professional fire
departments in many communities (Rubin, 2007). The occurrence of major natural
disasters that spanned many states prompted the federal government to create national
level organizations, like the National Weather Service, consequently, paving the way for
planned and systematic approaches to emergency management (ibid). The occurrence of
major disasters in the 1900s (e.g., 1900 Galveston hurricane, the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake, and the great Mississippi flood of 1927) overwhelmed individual capability
to respond, thus leading to more governmental roles in disaster response (ibid). The
federal government’s increased interest in emergency management led to the passage of
the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which gave the federal government the authority to make
disaster declarations (Waugh, 2000). The federal government was also interested in civil
defense, particularly during the World War II. As a result, the federal government created
the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (ibid). This act became even more relevant during
the cold war with the Soviet Union. Amid the cold war, major disasters-Alaska
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earthquake in 1964, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969, Hurricane
Agnes in 1972, Three Mile Island nuclear mishap in 1979-drew public attention (ibid)
and exposed the fragility of the current emergency management system (Rubin, 2007).
Pressures from various quarters prompted President Jimmy Carter to create the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1978 (Waugh, 2000). FEMA is the lead
agency for emergencies in the United States and responsible for coordinating disaster
efforts with states, local emergency, and nongovernmental agencies.
Although, disasters often wreak havoc whenever and wherever they occur, they
provide us with lessons that can help to sinew our national emergency management
system. One such disaster is the 9/11 terrorist attacks which changed the world of
emergency management (Tierney, 2006; Rubin, 2007; Waugh, 2007). These attacks have
altered the social and political context of emergency management (Waugh, 2007), so
much so that Tierney (2006, p 406) describes the attacks of 9/11 as the “ultimate focusing
event”. Two vivid examples of social changes are the contracting out of emergency
management services to private and nonprofit organizations and the increased
participation of local governments in emergency management decisions (Waugh, 2007).
On the political side, the most visible change is that FEMA was subsumed under the
Department of Homeland Security in 2003 (Tierney, 2006; Rubin, 2007; Waugh, 2007).
This reorganization has led to diminished capabilities to deal with natural disasters
(Waugh, 2006; Gerber, 2007). For instance, the reorganization has resulted in the
diversion of financial and human resources from other threats, such as hurricanes to
securing the homeland (Tierney, 2006; Waugh, 2007).
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According to Waugh (2000), the National Governors’ Association developed the
“all hazard” approach in the early 1970s (FEMA adopted this model afterwards). The
assumption of this model is that disasters have some elements in common. Therefore, the
expectation is that local, state, and federal emergency programs and policies can take
advantage of the similarities by developing generic responses for different hazards.
Emergency managers can design similar warning systems and use the same mass
evacuation plan for different disasters. For example, local shelters could serve as a place
of refuge for both earthquake and hurricane victims. Waugh (2004) enumerates some
advantages of the “all hazards” approach-it reduces cost and saves time, standardizes
some aspects of the four phases, provides a framework for organizing our thinking, easy
to remember and follow during emergencies, and creates opportunities for risk managers
to have broader perspectives on hazards and disasters. On the contrary, it may be
sometimes difficult to identify common elements among the four phases for all types of
disasters or emergencies. For instance, preparing for pandemic flu may have little or no
similarities with preparing for an earthquake due to the air-borne nature of the former.
The all-hazard model divides all emergency management programs and policies
into four activities: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Waugh, 2000).
These four activities or phases constitute the disaster policy cycle (May, 1986).
Mitigation includes those activities aimed at preventing or reducing losses from disasters
(Waugh, 2000). These activities can be structural or non-structural. Structural mitigation
activities include adopting building codes, building levees and including surveillance
equipment in buildings to prevent terrorist attacks (ibid). Non-structural mitigation
measures include instituting land-use regulations and zoning ordinances to prevent people
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from building in floodplains. Preparedness is planning for response purposes and
developing effective response capabilities before an emergency or disaster occurs (ibid).
It encompasses all actions taken to allow social units to respond after disasters (Tierney et
al., 2001). Preparedness activities include training responders, establishing warning
systems, developing contingency plans, and acquiring equipment and supplies. Response
entails reacting immediately to disasters or emergencies (Waugh, 2000). Response
activities include detecting threats, issuing warnings, evacuating threatened populations
(Tierney et al., 2001), supplying water to victims, covering building rooftops, providing
shelter, and providing medical services. Recovery, which is typically the one-year after a
disaster deals with long time restoration of a disaster-stricken community after an
emergency or disaster (Fothergill & Peek, 2004). Recovery activities include restoring
lifelines like power and telephones, providing counseling for responders, making small
loans available for victims, removing debris, and facilitating long-term reconstruction of
homes and businesses.

Disasters and Organizational Survival
An organization is “a social unit with some particular purposes” (Shafritz et al.,
2005 p 1). One of the fundamental goals of organizations is survival (ibid).The survival
of organizations is very important so much so that organizational theorists have devoted
much time to studying how organizations manage to survive (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Acquisition and maintenance of resources are vital to organizational survival
(Alesch & Petak, 2001; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Because no organization is self reliant,
every organization must transact with its external environment for needed resources
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(ibid). However, the external environment is not dependable and may sometimes
threaten the survival of organizations. Disasters may cause organizational disruption
(Lindell & Perry, 2007), loss of sales and property taxes (Tierney, 1994), and loss of
services from public organizations and nonprofits, consequently, undermining the
economy and support systems of communities (Lindell & Perry, 2007). For instance,
earthquakes may destroy lifelines, like major highways, on which organizations depend
for transporting raw materials and rendering services. Organizations cannot control the
physical characteristics of disasters, such as magnitude and frequency (Nigg, 1996); they
can however, reduce their impacts. Organizations can ameliorate disaster impacts by
engaging in a number of mitigation and preparedness measures (Dahlhamer & D’Souza,
1997). In order to ensure survival, organizations should evaluate their vulnerability to
various disasters and take appropriate preparedness and mitigation steps accordingly. In
so doing, organizations would stand a better chance of remaining open and continuing
their day-to-day operations during and after disasters.

The Importance of Mitigation and Preparedness
Mitigation and preparedness are crucial to the design of effective disaster policies
(May, 1986). Mitigation and preparedness are important to society both practically (to
organizations and the emergency management community) and theoretically (to the
academic community). First, mitigation and preparedness can make it easier for
organizations to survive disasters by providing opportunities to lessen their severity. For
example, before an earthquake, it is possible to institute building codes that will help to
strengthen buildings. Once an earthquake occurs, it will be too late to carry out this

18

measure. Similarly, organizations with effective contingency plans and warning systems
would stand a better chance of survival than organizations without these preparedness
measures. Second, if organizations have mitigation and preparedness strategies in place,
they are likely to be less reliant on emergency responders, thus freeing up resources for
other purposes. It is important to emphasize here that effective mitigation and
preparedness programs and policies for disasters do not preclude the need for emergency
responders. Third, mitigation and preparedness can help to lay a solid foundation for
effective disaster response (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997) and serve as a first step in
understanding recovery in organizations. In other words, mitigation and preparedness can
assist researchers in understanding why some organizations fail and others survive
disasters. For instance, researchers may gather pre-disaster information from a particular
sample of organizations on mitigation and preparedness and then examine the same
organizations post-disaster to understand the mitigation and preparedness strategies that
were instrumental to survival and those that were not.

Determinants of Mitigation and Preparedness in Organizations
The overall objective of this section is to review the literature on the determinants
of mitigation and preparedness in organizations. Due to limited studies on this topic,
much of the information will emanate from the literature on how households and
organizations mitigate and prepare for disasters.
A major preoccupation for researchers and practitioners involved in disaster
management is developing an understanding of the factors leading to the adoption of
mitigation and preparedness measures. At the household level, mitigation and
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preparedness activities might include purchasing earthquake insurance, shutting off
utilities, developing emergency plans, buying first aid kits, and storing food and water
(e.g., Davis, 1989; Mileti & O’Brien, 1992; Edward, 1993; Farley et al., 1993). At the
community level or policy subsystem level, they might include building codes, zoning
ordinances, and land use planning (e.g., Olshansky, 1994; Flynn et al., 1999).
Organizations can also engage in a number of mitigation and preparedness activities,
such as bracing shelves and equipment, purchasing earthquake or flood insurance,
developing an emergency plan, buying generators, and storing supplies (Dahlhamer &
D’Souza, 1997).
At the household level of analysis, many disaster researchers have focused on the
determinants of preparedness and mitigation. At this level, the story is clear; household
preparedness depends, among other determinants on presence of children (Edwards,
1993), marital status (Dooley et al., 1992), education (Edwards, 1993; Bourque et al.,
2006), concern about a disaster (Dooley et al., 1992), household income (Edwards, 1993;
Bourque et al., 2006), and length of residence (Dooley et al., 1992). At the organizational
level, the determinants are ambiguous and the number of research is limited. Some
scholars have recognized the dearth of studies in this area and have called for more
research on disaster preparedness and mitigation at the organizational level (e.g., Drabek,
1986; Dynes & Drabek, 1994). Drabek (1986) came to this conclusion after his review of
the disaster literature unearthed only a few disaster studies on organizational disaster
preparedness. He argues that more research in this field would enable disaster researchers
document the determinants of disaster planning within the private sector (ibid). Some
researchers have heeded Drabek’s call. About a decade ago, Dahlhamer & D’Souza
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(1997) studied the determinants of business disaster preparedness in Memphis/Shelby
County, Tennessee and Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa. A few years later, Webb et al.
(2000) used a series of surveys to explore the preparedness and recovery experiences of
businesses in different parts of the country, including Memphis, Tennessee. The
following paragraphs discuss the determinants of mitigation and preparedness in
organizations.
Firm size is the most consistent (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997) and important
(Webb et al., 2000) predictor of organizational mitigation and preparedness in studies
conducted by the Disaster Research Center (DRC). Past studies suggest that larger firms
do more to mitigate and prepare for disasters than do smaller firms. For example, in their
study of 18 chemical companies, Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that larger companies
were more likely to engage in more planning than smaller companies did. Similarly, in a
study of disaster evacuation planning in the tourist industry, Drabek (1991, 1994a,
1994b) found that firms with more employees had more extensive disaster evacuation
plans than firms with less employees. Some researchers interpreted this relationship in
the context of resource availability; the argument is that larger firms have more resources
to devote to disaster mitigation and preparedness than smaller firms do. Such a resource
argument is common in the literature on disasters at the household (Mileti, 1999),
community (May & Birkland, 1994; Wood, 2004), and organizational level (Mileti et al.,
1993; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Tierney, 2006).
The next determinant is previous disaster experience. In a study of business
preparedness among 20 St. Louis businesses, Barlow (1993) found that previous disaster
experience was the best predictor of business preparedness. Similarly, Drabek (1994a,
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1994b) found that businesses with more disaster experience engaged in more disaster
evacuation planning than those with little or no experience of a disaster.
Another determinant of organizational mitigation and preparedness is own or
lease business property. Although, this determinant has been found to be related to
household preparedness (e.g., Turner et al., 1986), it has only been examined in relation
to business preparedness about a decade ago by Dahlhamer & D’Souza (1997). These
researchers found that businesses that owned their properties were more likely than those
that leased their properties to engage in more preparedness. This result makes sense
because owners of a business property would be more interested in the survival of the
property than lessees would (Webb et al., 2000). In addition, owners of a property have
the legal authority to make changes to it. For instance, the owner of a building can make
structural changes, while a lessee would not have the legal authority to make such
changes.
Evidence in the disaster literature indicates that some sectors engage in more
mitigation and preparedness than others do. For instance, Drabek (1991, 1995) found that
there was a significant relationship between business type and disaster evacuation
planning, with lodging businesses having more extensive disaster evacuation plans than
restaurants, entertainment businesses, and firms in the travel industry. Similarly, in their
study of 54 firms on preparedness for earthquakes in San Francisco, Mileti et al. (1993)
found an indirect relationship between firm type and earthquake preparedness. Further,
Dahlhamer & D’Souza (1997) found that businesses in the finance, insurance, and real
estate, do more to prepare for disasters than businesses in other sectors. One reason for
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this finding is the higher degree of regulation and oversight in this sector (Webb et al.,
2000).
The age of an organization is the next determinant of interest. Drabek (1991)
found that firms that have been in existence for at least six years were more likely to have
more extensive disaster evacuation plans than younger firms were. On the contrary,
Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that newer chemical firms were more likely than were
older chemical firms to prepare for disasters. In sum, the findings regarding the effect of
age on organizational preparedness are inconsistent (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).
Evidence in disaster research suggests that high level of concern over disaster
impacts, such as loss of life and personal injury, may induce individuals to engage in
preparedness activities (Nigg, 1986). In her study of the effect of the Iben Browning
earthquake prediction, Showalter (1993) found a positive relationship between concern
over loss of life and personal injury and respondents’ willingness to engage in
preparedness activities. There is a body of research on risk and disaster visualizations,
which suggests that information on the potential impacts of disasters can motivate people
to reduce their risks (e.g., Sandman, et al., 1994).
Ownership pattern implies whether an organization is a single firm or a franchise.
Empirical evidence suggests that franchises do more to mitigate and prepare for disasters
than single firms. For instance, Drabek (1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995) found that firms that
were part of a larger chain engaged in more disaster evacuation planning than single
firms did. This finding is in line with that of Quarantelli et al. (1979), who found that
national chemical companies engaged in more preparedness than single local chemical
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firms did. This finding may be due to the mandates given to local chapters by corporate
headquarters to engage in disaster preparedness (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).
Organizational obstacles
Both internal and external obstacles confront organizations. This study focuses on
internal organizational obstacles to disaster mitigation and preparedness, while
recognizing that there are external organizational obstacles as well, such as competition
from other organizations. By internal organizational obstacle, I mean factors inside the
organization that inhibit organizations’ ability to mitigate and prepare for disasters. For
instance, lack of information on disasters can impede the adoption of mitigation and
preparedness activities by organizations. This study examines three types of internal
organizational obstacles and their relationship to mitigation and preparedness (i) lack of
information (ii) lack of management and organizational members’ support, and (iii) lack
of financial resources. Because I consider internal obstacles only, the word “obstacle”
implies internal organizational obstacles.
Information
Disasters can sometimes be beyond human control. We can however, mitigate and
prepare using an important ingredient, the acquisition of information (Major, 1998). For
instance, in making the choice to allocate resources toward disaster mitigation and
preparedness, organizations need information about possible damages of potential
disasters. This study does recognize that mere availability of information does not
automatically guarantee the adoption of mitigation and preparedness activities by an
organization. There may need to be changes in the belief of organizational members or
changes in the political status quo, which may take several years to occur (Sabatier,
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1999). This study refers to any information that is suppose to help or has the potential to
help organizations mitigate and prepare for disasters as “disaster-related information”.
Disaster-related information can be in the form of hurricane, earthquake, and flood,
forecasts. For example, hurricane forecasts can provide organizations with information on
the path of a hurricane. Organizations can obtain disaster-related information from
representatives of federal, state, and local governments, nonprofits, private sector, and
research institutions. The disaster management literature has focused much on the role of
information in household preparedness for earthquakes. Information on earthquake risks
can induce households to take preparatory action (Jackson & Mukerjee 1974; Sullivan et
al., 1977; Palm, 1981; Turner, 1983; Russell et al., 1995; Flynn et al., 1999; Atwood &
Major, 2000; Celsi et al., 2005). A notable example is the impact of Iben Browning’s
forecast that a major earthquake in the NMSZ would occur around December 3, 1990
(e.g., Farley et al., 1993; Showalter, 1993; Atwood & Major, 2000). This prediction led to
an increase in household preparedness (Farley et al., 1993) and made households more
prepared for future earthquakes (Showalter, 1993). I grouped the following three
obstacles under lack of information: lack of information about the frequency and
magnitude of disasters, lack of convincing information about the potential impacts of
disasters, and unclear organizational benefits from disaster planning and mitigation.
Management Support
Researchers have documented the pivotal role policy entrepreneurs or champions
play in the policymaking process (e.g., Kingdon, 1984; Prater & Lindell, 2000; Wood,
2004; Olshansky, 2005). These entrepreneurs are willing to, among other strategies,
mobilize support for their issues if necessary (Berke & Beatley, 1992). Support is just as
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important in organizations as it is in the policymaking arena. For instance, the support of
upper level management is crucial in the adoption of mitigation and preparedness
measures. In order to make structural changes to an organization’s building, the support
of upper level management is paramount. This study is interested in knowing whether
organizations consider lack of support from upper-level management and lack of support
from mid- and lower-level organizational members as obstacles to disaster planning.
Financial Resources
Mitigating and preparing for disasters require time, money, and effort (Wyner &
Mann, 1986). Lack of financial and technical resources can constrain the adoption of
earthquake mitigation policies (Bostrom et al., 2006). This study focuses on whether
organizations consider lack of financial resources as an obstacle to disaster planning.

Study Location: Memphis/Shelby County and Disasters
Memphis is the largest city in Tennessee with a population of about 650 thousand
people. Its location on the banks of the Mississippi River provides access to river
navigation and protection from pernicious floods. Earthquakes are a big disaster risk in
the Memphis area due to the hazard posed by the New Madrid Fault Zone. The three
most powerful earthquakes in the United States (magnitude 7.0-8.1) occurred in the
NMSZ (Memphis/Shelby County were not a settlement then) between December 16,
1811 and February 7, 1812 (United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2008a). While
many dispute the characterization of the risk, USGS (1998) estimated that there is more
than 90% probability of a moderate earthquake (magnitude 6-7) hitting the NMSZ within
the next 50 years. In comparison to California, the USGS (2008b) notes that the odds of a
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magnitude 6.7 or larger earthquake in the next 30 years in California is more than 99
percent. In general, the seismic risks from the NMSZ are of low probability and high
consequences (Olshansky, 1994).
Still, Memphis faces threats from other disasters, such as floods, tornadoes, ice
storms, chemical spills, fires, severe storms, violent crimes, and toxic releases. For
instance, on July 22, 2003 a windstorm (later called Hurricane Elvis) left over 300,000
utility consumers in the dark; it took two weeks to restore power for everyone (Shepard,
2003).
A study of organizations in Memphis/Shelby County makes for an interesting
case for several reasons. The rarity of major earthquakes (magnitude 7.0 or greater) in
Memphis/Shelby County in recent time poses challenges for organizations in deciding to
mitigate and prepare. The occurrence of major earthquakes (what Birkland, 1997, refers
to as focusing event) can induce organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness
measures. Absence of such disasters makes organizations apathetic and reluctant to adopt
such measures (May, 1986; Lindell & Perry, 2007). In addition, a vast majority of
studies on earthquakes and disasters exist on the west coast and, especially, California
(e.g., Jackson & Mukerjee, 1974; Kiecolt & Nigg, 1982; Mulilis & Duval, 1995;
Argothy, 2003; May & Wood, 2003; Wood, 2004; Celsi et al., 2005). Very few studies
have analyzed responses to disaster risks in Memphis (e.g., Edwards, 1993) and few in
the NMSZ where risks have low probabilities and high consequences (e.g., Mushkatel &
Nigg, 1987; Olshansky, 1994; Farley, 1998; Major, 1998; Atwood & Major, 2000).
Finally, studies on organizational preparedness suggest that organizations in
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Memphis/Shelby County do little to prepare for disasters (e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza,
1997; Webb et al., 2000).
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

The goal of this chapter is to present the methodology of this study. It begins with
the procedure for data collection and the strengths and limitations of the data. Then it
presents a model of organizational mitigation and preparedness, the dependent and
independent variables, the hypotheses to be tested, and the estimation techniques. The
chapter concludes with an outline of the Heckman approach to sample selection and a
brief discussion of sample representativeness.

Data Collection
The data used in this study comes from the collective effort of a group of
researchers and graduate students (I was one of the graduate students) studying the
influence of organizational structures on earthquake decision-making in Memphis/Shelby
County, Tennessee. I will refer to this data as the organizational survey data and this
group of researchers as the research team.
The research team collected disaster information from a stratified random sample
of public, private, and non-profit organizations involved in disaster risk issues and
organizations that a major disaster will significantly affect. The target organizations
included, but were not limited to utility companies, schools, health facilities, chemical
companies, pharmaceutical companies, financial institutions, religious institutions,
transportation, and restaurants. The data gathering procedure occurred in two phases:
Interview phase and survey phase. In addition to these two methods, the research team
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used publicly available documents and reports, such as newspaper articles. Table 3.1
shows the research schedule, which started in fall 2005 and ended in spring 2007.
Table 3.1. Research schedule
Task
Analyze publicly available documents and reports
Identify stakeholders, private and public organizations
Develop interview instrument and conduct interviews
with organizational representative(s)
Develop survey instrument and conduct surveys
Analyze data
Prepare stakeholder report

Schedule
Fall 2005-Spring 2007
Fall 2005
Spring 2006
Summer 2006-Fall 2006
Fall 2006-Spring 2007
Spring 2007

Interview Phase
In this phase, the research team conducted 15 exploratory interviews with 15
different organizations in Memphis/Shelby County in the spring and summer of 2006.
The interviews consisted of open-ended interview questions, conducted in person or via
telephone with the professional managers in the offices of their organizations. Interview
questions addressed attitudes toward hazard risk management and risk information, as
well as organizational actions with respect to risk. The interviews took approximately 3060 minutes each. The research team typed up the interviews and sent them back to the
interviewees to ensure the accuracy of the information provided.
Survey Phase
This phase consisted of a survey administered in fall 2006. The interviews
informed the survey questions, which were in two parts. The first part consists of
questions regarding risk issues in organizations, such as availability of risk managers,
amount of resources devoted to disaster planning, level of disaster concern, use of
disaster information, impacts of disasters, engagement in mitigation and preparedness

30

activities, sources of disaster information, and obstacles to disaster planning. The second
part deals with demographic information about organizational representatives that
answered the surveys, such as age, length of residence in Memphis/Shelby County,
duration in current position within the organization, and educational level.
With the help of the Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce, the research
team queried an online reference service, ReferenceUSA using “number of employees” as
a key index variable. Since the number of organizations in categories with less than 100
employees far exceeded the number of organizations in categories with hundreds of
employee, the research team stratified the population by employee size to allow
organizations of all sizes in the Memphis Metropolitan Area to be surveyed and
represented in sufficient numbers to analyze. There were 11 categories, which ranged
from one employee to over 9999 employees. The research team re-categorized “number
of employees” into seven categories-(1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, and
≥500). The research team sampled 100 organizations from the first 6 categories and
sampled the entire population of 101 organizations from the last category, and added 32
utility companies to make 733 organizations.
The research team delivered the surveys following a modification of Dillman’s
total design method (Dillman, 2000). Dillman’s method emphasizes a systematic series of
remailings and follow-ups to achieve an optimum response rate (ibid). This method is
common among disaster researchers (e.g., Palm, et al., 1990; Edwards, 1993; Showalter,
1993; Tierney, 2000). The research team mailed a letter on University letterhead to each
of the 733 organizations. This letter described the study and sought their participation.
The research team then mailed the first batch of surveys and followed-up with postcards,
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and then the second batch of surveys. The research team received organizational
characteristics recorded in ReferenceUSA, such as name, address, city, and Zip Code. The
research team removed all identifying information (including names and addresses) and
duplicates from this dataset and merged it with information from the survey to generate
the organizational survey data. Table 3.2 shows all the organizational characteristics and
their descriptions.
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Table 3.2. Organizational characteristics and their descriptions
Organizational Characteristic
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY
ST
ZIPCODE
ZIP4
COUNTY
MSA
PHONE
FAX
EMP_SIZE
SALES
BUS_STATUS
PARENT_COMPANY_NAME
LASTNAME
FIRSTNAME
TITLECODE
GENDER
CREDIT_RATING

NAICS_DESCRIPTION
CREDIT_RATING_SCORE

Description
Company Name
Address of company
City location of company
State location of company
Zip code
Postal code for geographic segment
County location of company
Metropolitan Service Area
Phone number
Fax number
Number of employees
Category for amount of sales
Branch, single location, subsidiary
Name of company that owns business
Last Name of person liable
First Name of person in liable
Title of person liable
Male or female
Companies credit rating – descriptive
category
Internet address
North American Industry Classification
System
Type of Company
Credit rating scale based on alphabet

CREDIT_NUMERIC_SCORE
SQUARE_FOOTAGE

Numeric credit score
Physical space of building in square feet

OWN_OR_LEASE
WORK-AT-HOME

Site owned or leased
Home based business

YEAR_ESTABLISHED

Year business was established

LATITUDE

Latitude coordinates

LONGITUDE

Longitude coordinates

PSICCODE

Primary Standard Industrial
Classification Code
Description of Standard Industrial
Classification Code

URL
NAICS

PRIMARY_SIC_DESCRIPTION

Source: Adapted from ReferenceUSA
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Of the 733 organizations, 227 Memphis/Shelby County organizations returned the
survey, giving a response rate of about 31% (10 organizations declined to participate in
the study for various reasons, e.g. business is not fully operational and due to private
nature of business). Although, this response rate may appear low, there is evidence that
similar response rates are common in disaster research. For instance, Showalter’s (1993)
earthquake study at the household level obtained a response rate of 30%. Some
researchers actually think a response rate of 30% is high in earthquake research (e.g.,
Davis, 1989). The low response could be because the research team addressed the
surveys to the owners or risk managers of organizations. Owners of organizations,
especially those whose organization do not have risk managers may not have the time to
answer our surveys. Nevertheless, what is more important about this response rate is the
extent to which it provides a balanced sample of the original population, which I discuss
later in this study.
In addition to the interviews and surveys, the research team analyzed publicly
available documents and reports. Memphis newspapers were particularly helpful in
providing historical background on disasters in the Memphis Area. Equally useful were
the USGS and FEMA reports that provided geologic and historical information on the
NMSZ.
Data Strengths and Limitations
Data Strength
The organizational survey data is unique in two ways. (i) It contains rare
information on organizational representatives’ perspective on how their organizations
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address disaster risks. Getting disaster information on organizations is difficult because
some organizations are afraid of the potential consequences of divulging such
information (Auf der Heide, 1998). One of the reasons given for not wanting to answer
the survey is the fear of divulging information to the public. In addition, most studies on
disasters have focused on levels other than organizations (Tierney, 1997; Webb et al.,
2000). (ii) It contains information on organizational mitigation and preparedness for
many types of disasters in a moderate seismic region. The literature on disasters shows
that there is a tendency for researchers investigating disaster preparedness in
organizations to focus on specific hazards (Mileti, 1999). Thus, with the exception of the
Disaster Research Center (DRC) data, there are no other data available, to my knowledge,
on how organizations are preparing for different types of disasters. In addition, some
researchers have surveyed organizations in high seismic regions, like California, only a
small number of researchers have surveyed organizations in the NMSZ.
Data Limitation: Internal Validity
Internal validity refers to the possibility that the conclusions drawn by a study
may not precisely reflect what went on in that study (Babbie, 2007). Prior to the design of
the organizational surveys, the research team conducted 15 interviews to understand how
Memphis/Shelby County organizations are coping with disasters. These interviews
helped the research team understand the issues of interest and the way Memphis
organizations conceptualize these issues. For instance, the research team gained insights
on what Memphis/Shelby County organizations understand by the word “disasters”.
Their understanding of the word seems to emphasize mainly natural disasters like
earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes. This helped the research team to define relevant
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concepts properly prior to administering the surveys. However, this study recognizes the
potential threat to internal validity resulting from testing (ibid). For instance, the
organizations interviewed, who are among those that answered the survey may give
biased responses on the survey because they already knew what issues were of interest to
the research team from the preliminary interviews. Fortunately, the research team
interviewed only 15 organizations.
Data Limitation: Data Entry Errors and Reliability
Reliability relates to questions of stability and consistency (Singleton & Straits,
1999). Two graduate students, including myself entered and coded the organizational
survey data separately. The other coder and I resolved a few discrepancies, which were
mainly typographical in nature. The objective is to make sure that both coders using same
coding and data entry instruments obtain equivalent results (ibid).
Data Limitation: Missing Values
The organizational survey data has a number of missing values: Total number of
mitigation and preparedness activities (19), disaster impact (21), and organizational
obstacle (55). I recoded missing values as zeroes for the dependent variable, total number
of mitigation and preparedness activities. The recoding has implication for interpreting
this dependent variable when it has a value of zero. A value of zero for this variable now
represents respondents that did not engage in any mitigation and preparedness activity or
that did not provide an answer to this question. In addition, I recoded missing values and
"not applicable" responses as zeros for the independent variables, disaster impact and
organizational obstacle. Similarly, this recoding changes the way I interpret these
independent variables when they have a value of zero. A value of zero for both
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independent variables represent respondents that selected not applicable or respondents
that did not answer either of the two questions on these independent variables. It does
seem reasonable to recode not applicable as zero for these independent variables because
by selecting not applicable, the respondent is indirectly saying that a disaster impact is
less than “minor disaster impact” or that an organizational obstacle is less than “minor
obstacle”. In this case, zero is less than “minor disaster impact” and less than “minor
obstacle”, each of which has a value of one. After the recoding exercise, the sample size
went up from 146 to 215. Later in this study, I carry out some analyses using 146 and 215
observations and compare the results. The goal is to ascertain if the recoding has any
effects on the results.
Data Limitation: Selection Bias
One of the potential problems of any survey is selection bias. The organizational
survey dataset is not immune from this problem. Each organization in the sample
population (733) may not have an equal chance of answering the survey. For instance,
organizations that responded to the survey may be those that actually care about disasters
and may already be mitigating and preparing for disasters. Others not interested in
disasters and not doing anything to mitigate and prepare may be less apt to answer the
survey. The implication is that the sample may not be representative of the general
population of organizations in Memphis/Shelby County. If I run OLS on a sample that
suffers from selection bias, the sample coefficients will be biased (Giles, 2001). There are
some ways of addressing selection bias problems including the Heckman’s approach and
the bounding method. Later in this study, I use the Heckman approach to correct potential
selection bias problems.
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Unit of Analysis
Disaster researchers have studied disasters at levels other than the organization. In
fact, many studies in the disaster management literature focus either on household
surveys (e.g., Davis, 1989; Dooley et al., 1992; Edwards, 1993; Farley, 1998; Atwood &
Major, 2000) or on surveys of policy elites active in a community (e.g., Drabek et al.,
1983; Mushkatel & Nigg, 1987; Berke & Beatley, 1992; May & Birkland, 1994; Burby et
al., 2000; Wood, 2004). Due to the relative shortage of disaster research at the
organizational level compared to other levels of analysis, some researchers (e.g., Tierney,
1997; Webb et al., 2000) have called for more research at the organizational level. The
unit of analysis in this study is the organization. The potential for organizations to
mitigate and prepare for disasters is immense. This study recognizes this huge potential
and hopes to make policy recommendations aimed at capitalizing on the potentials of
organizations in mitigating and preparing for disasters.

A Model of Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness
In this section, I present a model of mitigation and preparedness at the
organizational level of analysis. This model was developed based on prior research on
business disaster preparedness (e.g., Quarantelli et al., 1979; Dahlhamer & D’Souza,
1997; Webb et al., 2000) and earthquake preparedness at the household level (e.g., Nigg,
1986; Showalter, 1993). This study assumes that the relationships that exist at the
organizational level between the dependent variable and the independent variables will
also exist at the household level.
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Concern over
disaster impact
(+)

Organizational
obstacle (+)
Organizational
obstacle2 (-)
Single location
firm (-)

Organizational
size (+)
Organizational
Mitigation and
Preparedness
(Dependent
variable)

Independent
variables
Own business
property (+)

Past disaster
experience
(+)

Age of
organization
(+/-)

Control
variables

Sectors:
Education (+),
Health (+),
Wholesale &
Retail (-)

Figure 3.1. A model of organizational mitigation and preparedness.
Source: Author

39

This assumption is reasonable because households and organizations share many
goals, including survival. This model is a simple representation of the factors that affect
mitigation and preparedness in organizations and the potential direction of each factor
(Figure 3.1). Double borders represent independent variables that this study analyzes.
Single borders represent independent variables that this study does not analyze due to
unavailability of information (e.g., past disaster experience) and missing values (e.g.,
own business property and age of organization). Efforts to fill the gaps have not yielded
positive results. For instance, I have visited the websites of some of the organizations
who did not specify the year their organization was established in the hope of finding this
information. I was successful for a few, but many did not indicate this information on
their websites.

Variable Measurement
Dependent variable
This study defines the dependent variable, total number of mitigation and
preparedness activities as organizational engagement in 10 mitigation and preparedness
activities. The survey asked, “Has your organization engaged in any of these activities
over the past year?” Each of the dependent variables has two options, yes and no. The
mitigation and preparedness activities are: (i) Attended disaster meetings/training courses
outside your organization. (ii) Mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational
meeting. (iii) Held disaster-related workshops/trainings within your organization. (iv)
Discussed in an organizational meeting short-term responses to disasters. (v) Discussed in
an organizational meeting long-term strategies for recovery from disasters. (vi) Arranged
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site visits by consultants or experts to better prepare for disasters. (vii) Provided
information to customers/members of the community on issues related to disasters. (viii)
Assessed or evaluated vulnerability to disasters or estimated potential losses from
disasters. (ix) Engaged in non-structural mitigation measures (e.g., securing computers).
(x) Engaged in structural mitigation measures (e.g., strengthening parts of a building).
The operational measure of the dependent variable is an index of the
aforementioned 10 different mitigation and preparedness activities that organizations can
engage in. I created 10 dummy variables, each coded 1 for those organizations who said
they engaged in that particular activity over the year and 0 otherwise. I added the
responses for each respondent to arrive at the total number of mitigation and
preparedness activity, totactivity for each observation. This ten-item index is very reliable
(Cronbach’s alpha = .88). Adding mitigation and preparedness activities together is a
simple and convenient way of creating an index, but it does have its own problems. First,
the addition implies that each activity is equally weighted. Based on effort, for example,
it is not reasonable to expect that “Mentioning a potential disaster in an organizational
meeting” would require the same level of effort as “Engaging in structural mitigation”.
Second, the addition makes the values of the dependent variable range from 0 to 10. The
lower and upper bounds create problems for Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression
technique. I discuss the implication of these bounds for OLS later in the study.
This study examines two other proxies for mitigation and preparedness. The first
is use of disaster information. The survey question states “Do you use disaster-related
information to help make decisions in your organization?” Respondents could answer
either a yes or a no. This dependent variable is dichotomous and I coded it as follows: yes
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= 1 and no = 0. The second proxy for mitigation and preparedness is presence of risk
manager. The survey question asks respondents; “Does your organization have a risk
manager?” Respondents could answer either a yes or a no. This dependent variable is also
dichotomous and coded: yes = 1 and no = 0.
This study examines briefly another construction of the dependent variable-active
and passive measures to address disaster risks. Active measures are those activities that
involve an organization actually doing something to address disasters not just discussing
about actions to take (activities i, iii, vi, vii, viii, ix, & x). Passive measures are activities
that involve an organization simply discussing or mentioning potential actions in an
organizational meeting (activities ii, iv, & v).
Independent variables
This study explains mitigation and preparedness using the following independent
variables: (i) Concern over disaster impacts, (ii) organizational obstacles, (iii) ownership
patterns of organizations, and (iv) organizational size. In addition, this study includes
three variables as controls for organizational sector: education, health, and
wholesale/retail trade. Table 3.3 shows the independent variables, their operational
measures and scales of measurement, and the theoretical justification for their inclusion.

42

Table 3.3. Independent variables, operational measures, coding scheme, and theoretical
justification
Independent
Variables

Operational
Measure

Coding Scheme

Causal Explanation/
Theory

Concern over disaster
impact

An index of
13 measures
of disaster
impact

(Nigg, 1986;
Showalter, 1993)

Organizational
obstacles

An index of 6
measures of
organizational
obstacle

Likert scale:
1=Minor Adverse
Impact to
5=Major Adverse
Impact
Likert scale: 1=
Minor obstacle to
5=Major obstacle

Single location
organization

Obtained
from
Memphis
Regional
Chambers of
Commerce
Obtained
from
Memphis
Regional
Chambers of
Commerce
Obtained
from
Memphis
Regional
Chambers of
Commerce

0= “other”
organizational
type, 1=single
location
organization,

(Quarntelli et al.,
1979; Drabek, 1991,
1994a, 1994b, 1995)

Continuous:
Number of
employees

(Quarantelli et al.,
1979; Dahlhamer &
D’Souza, 1997;
Webb et al., 2000)

Dichotomous:
0= “other” sector,
1= Educational
sector
0= “other” sector,
1= Health sector
0= “other” sector,
1=
Wholesale/Retail
sector

(Drabek, 1991, 1995 ;
Dahlhamer &
D’Souza, 1997)

Organizational size

Sector-Education,
Health, and Wholesale/
Retail trade.

(Major, 1998; Wood,
2004; Bostrom et al.,
2006)

Concern over Disaster Impacts
As discussed in chapter two, disasters are capable of inflicting different types of
impacts, from loss of life to property destruction. Evidence in the disaster literature on
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household preparedness for earthquakes shows that people concerned over loss of life and
personal injury are likely to engage in preparedness activities (e.g., Nigg, 1986;
Showalter, 1993). Although, these examples are at the household level, I expect similar
relationship between concern over disaster impact and mitigation and preparedness at the
organizational level. In other words, organizations that are concerned about disaster
impacts are likely engage in mitigation and preparedness activities. For example,
organizations concerned over loss of employee life will be more likely to engage in
mitigation and preparedness activities than organizations that are not. I measure this
variable by the survey question: “Please indicate the extent to which the following
disaster impacts might adversely affect your organization” (1=Minor Adverse Impact and
5=Major Adverse Impact). Respondents could check a box for responses deemed “Not
Applicable”. The 13 disaster impacts are: (i) damaged reputation, (ii) disruption in
supplies or deliveries, (iii) inability to communicate with employees, (iv) inadequate
number of employees, (v) loss of commercial goods, (vi) loss of customers, (vii) loss of
data, (viii) loss of life, (ix) loss of life support (food, water, etc.), (x) loss relative to
competitor’s loss, (xi) power outage, (xii) structural damage, (xiii) transportation
disruption. The scale of the variables is 1 to 5 (minor to major adverse impact). For
simplicity, I consider scales1and 2 to be minor adverse impact, scale 3 to be moderate
adverse impact, and scales 4 and 5 to be major adverse impact. I create a new
independent variable, meanimpact, the mean of all the 13 impacts by adding the values
for all the disaster impacts (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81) and dividing by 13.
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Organizational Obstacles
I measure this independent variable by the survey question “Please indicate the
extent to which the following statements are obstacles to disaster planning in your
organization”. (a) Lack of financial resources to prepare for disasters (b) Lack of support
from upper-level management within your organization (c) Lack of support from mid-and
lover-level organizational members (d) Lack of information about the frequency and
magnitude of disasters (e) Lack of convincing information about the potential impacts of
disasters (f) Unclear organizational benefits from disaster planning and mitigation. The
scale of the variables is 1 to 5 (minor to major obstacle). For simplicity, I consider
scales1and 2 to be minor obstacle, scale 3 to be moderate obstacle, and scales 4 and 5 to
be major obstacle. I developed an index, meanobstacle the mean of all the obstacles by
adding the values for all the obstacles together (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) and dividing by
six. I generated a new variable, meanobstacle2 in Stata by squaring meanobstacle. This
new variable takes care of the non-linear relationship between the dependent variable,
totactivity and the independent variable, meanobstacle.
Ownership Pattern of Organizations
As discussed previously, by ownership pattern I mean whether an organization is
a single firm or a franchise. Evidence in the disaster literature indicates that franchises do
more to mitigate and prepare for disasters than single firms (e.g., Quarantelli et al., 1979;
Drabek, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995). This variable is a dummy, 1=single location firm,
0=“others”. The “others” category includes headquarters, subsidiaries, and branch.
Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce provided the information on whether an
organization is a single firm or franchise.
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Organizational size
Previous disaster studies suggest that larger firms do more to mitigate and prepare
for disasters than do smaller firms (Quarantelli et al., 1979; Drabek, 1991, 1994a, 1994b;
Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). This study operationalizes this variable by the number of
employees in an organization. Table 3.4 shows the seven organizational size categories,
the codes, frequencies, and percent for each category. More than half of the organizations
in the sample have less than one hundred employees. Memphis Regional Chambers of
Commerce provided the information on organizational size.
Table 3.4. Employee size categories
Employee size
1-9
10-19
20-49
50-99
100-249
250-499
>=500
Total

Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Frequency
37
22
30
32
47
33
14
215

%
17.21
10.23
13.95
14.88
21.86
15.35
6.51
100

Organizational Sector
Disaster researchers have found a significant relationship between organizational
sector and engaging in preparedness activities (Drabek, 1991; Mileti et al., 1993; Drabek,
1995; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). I introduce three variables as controls for three
sectors-Education, Health, and Wholesale/Retail trade. Each of these control variables is
a dummy variable, 1 if a respondent organization belongs to a sector and 0 if otherwise. I
obtained the information on organizational sector from Memphis Regional Chambers of
Commerce.
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Disaster Worry Levels for Different Disasters
This variable is not part of the regression but I discuss it in the descriptive
analysis. The survey question states, “Using the thermometer scale below, please indicate
the extent to which you perceive the following disasters are a worry for your
organization”, on a scale of 100 (a great deal of worry), 50 (moderate worry), and 0 (no
worry at all). The survey enumerated 15 disasters (Bird flu/pandemics, chemical spills,
drought, earthquakes, extreme heat, extreme winds/tornadoes, fires, flooding, hurricanes,
ice storms, severe storms, terrorist attacks, toxic releases, violent crimes, and water
pollution). In the “other” category, respondents indicated that they were concerned about
economic problems, racism, food contamination, blackout, vandalism and theft, airplane
crash, work stoppage (e.g. strikes), intruders, air pollution, and food poisoning.

Hypotheses
Recall that the main objective of this study is to answer the question “what are the
determinants of organizational mitigation and preparedness?” To answer this research
questions, I explore sub-questions i-iv below using alternative hypotheses 1-4
respectively (the null hypotheses is that there is no relationship between each of the
independent variables and the dependent variable). In addition, I use descriptive analysis
to address sub-questions (v-vii).
i.

Does concern over disaster impact lead to more mitigation and preparedness?

ii.

What is the relationship between organizational obstacles and mitigation and
preparedness?

47

iii.

Do single location organizations engage in less mitigation and preparedness than
other types of organizations?

iv.

Does organizational size have a positive effect on mitigation and preparedness?

v.

Which disasters are organizations worried about?

vi.

Which mitigation and preparedness activities do organizations typically engage
in?

vii.

Do organizations use disaster information in decision-making?

Hypothesis 1: Organizations that are concerned about disaster impact will be more likely
than organizations that are not to engage in mitigation and preparedness activities.
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between organizational obstacles and mitigation
and preparedness activities.
Hypothesis 3: Single location firms will be less likely to engage in mitigation and
preparedness activities than other types of organizations.
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between engagement in mitigation and
preparedness activities and organizational size.

Estimation Methodology
Tobit Analysis
In this section, this study uses Tobit analysis to answer the question “What are the
determinants of organizational mitigation and preparedness?” This study assumes that
there are some organizations in the sample that are against the adoption of mitigation and
preparedness activities. This study regards these organizations as having negative values
for mitigation and preparedness activities. Similarly, this study assumes that there are
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some organizations in the sample that engaged in more than 10 mitigation and
preparedness activities over the past year. For instance, some organizations might have
stored water and food in addition to the 10 activities.
Unfortunately, I have restricted the sample based on the dependent variable by
bounding it between 0 (lower limit) and 10 (upper limit). In other words, the dependent
variable is censored from both left and right. This means that I cannot observe
organizations that are below 0 or above 10. Tobit is the appropriate technique for
analyzing censored samples because it will take in to account organizations that engage
in negative and above 10 mitigation and preparedness activities.
OLS assumes normality meaning that the cumulative density function (CDF)
sums to one. However, due to the lower and upper bounds, the CDF does not sum to one.
Under this scenario, OLS is inappropriate. If I use OLS, the coefficients will be biased
and inconsistent. Tobit analysis corrects the omitted variable bias and accounts for the
fact that the expected values of the errors are changing. The Tobit model in this study
takes the form:
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (Yi*) = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) - β2
(organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle2) + β4 (single location) + β5
(organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health sector) - β8 (wholesale/retail
sector) + ε
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (Yi) = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) - β2
(organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle2) + β4 (single location) + β5
(organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health sector) - β8 (wholesale/retail
sector) + ε, if 0 < Yi* ≤ 10
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Yi = 0, if Yi* ≤ 0
Where, Yi* is the latent mitigation and preparedness activities adopted and Y i is the
observed mitigation and preparedness activities adopted.
Additional Analytical Techniques
In addition to using Tobit regression, this study uses Logit and OLS. It also
employs reliability analysis to construct indices for total number of mitigation and
preparedness activities, obstacles, and concern over disaster impacts. Lastly, it uses the
Heckman approach to correct for potential selection problems and the RESET and LINK
tests to test for misspecification of the organizational mitigation and preparedness model.

Sample Selection
One way to ascertain if there is sample selection in the organizational survey data
is to compare the distribution of respondents and non-respondents on observable
characteristics, such as zip code, organizational size, and organization type. If there is
statistical evidence that the two sub-populations are different on observable
characteristics, this may be evidence of sample selection. If otherwise, there may not be
sample selection. In the absence of sample selection, I can use OLS on the sub-population
of respondents to predict organizational mitigation and preparedness for the entire
population of organizations in the sample. If otherwise, it will result in biased OLS
estimates. My a priori expectation is that the two sub-populations are statistically
different because the research team addressed the surveys to owners and risk managers of
businesses. Organizations with risk managers may be more likely to answer the survey
than organizations without risk managers. Risk managers that engaged in mitigation and
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preparedness in the past year may see the survey as an opportunity to display their
mitigation and preparedness strategies.
Heckman Approach
In this section, I outline the Heckman approach to correct for selection bias in the
organizational survey data. I start by stating some Heckman assumptions.
1.

The errors are normally distributed.

2.

There is at least one more variable in the survey participation equation (selection

equation) than the organizational mitigation and preparedness equation (outcome
equation).
3.

The covariance between the errors of the organizational mitigation and

preparedness and survey participation equations is not zero.
Y = Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness (dependent variable)
X = Disaster impact, organizational obstacles, single location, organizational size,
educational sector, health sector, and wholesale/retail sector (independent variables)
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness Equation (outcome equation):
Y = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) - β2 (organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle2)
+ β4 (single location) + β5 (organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health
sector) - β8 (wholesale/retail sector) + ε,
if z = 1
Y = 0, if z = 0
Survey Participation Equation (Selection Equation):
Z = {1

if an organization answers survey, (α0+ α1 + μ = 1)}

Z = {0

if an organization does not answer survey, (α0 + α1 + μ = 0)}
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α0 + α1 + μ, is a measure of the organizational cost for mitigation and preparedness. This
measure is observable when an organization decides to answer the survey and
unobservable otherwise. The two errors, ε & μ will be normally distributed with mean of
zero, variance of σε 2 and σμ 2 respectively and ρ = Cov (ε, μ) ≠ 0. There is need to correct
for the non-zero covariance by including a Heckman correction term in the organizational
mitigation and preparedness equation. The correction term is:
ρ [φ (α0 + α1 + μ) / Φ (α0 + α1 + μ)] (The inverse Mill ratio)
Where φ and Φ are the values of the probability density and cumulative functions at f
(attributes) respectively. OLS on this new equation below will yield unbiased
coefficients.
Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness = β0 + β1 (disaster impact) - β2
(organizational obstacle) + β3 (organizational obstacle2) + β4 (single location) + β5
(organizational size) + β6 (educational sector) + β7 (health sector) - β8 (wholesale/retail
sector) + ρ [φ (α0i + α1i + μi) / Φ (α0i + α1i + μi)]
The instrumental variable for the Heckman is zip code. This study assumes that
the zip code in which an organization is located does not affect its ability to engage in
mitigation and preparedness activities, but it affects the probability that an organization
will answer the survey. It seems logical to think that organizations located in zip codes
with bad postal services may not receive the survey (e.g., the survey may be lost) and
thus will not be able to answer it. This instrument is not perfect because one can argue
that zip code may be a proxy for proximity to an earthquake fault. In that case, zip code
may have an effect on mitigation and preparedness.

52

This study groups zip codes by their fourth digits. For instance, 38150, 38152,
and 38157, all belong to the same cluster (the fourth digit is 8). I removed zip code
clusters with only one organization (four in total), because one organization in a cluster
will perfectly predict zip code in that cluster. There were six clusters of zip codes and I
create five dummy variables for five of them. Below are the null hypothesis and the
alternate hypothesis for the Heckman.
H0: There is no selection bias
H1: There is selection bias

Sample Representativeness
In this section, I look at how representative the organizational survey data is vis-àvis employee size. An understanding of how representative this sample is will give me an
idea of the extent to which I could generalize the findings of this study. Before, I proceed,
it is important to say that the intention of the research team is not to make the
organizational survey sample representative. Rather, the objective is to make the sample
contain enough large firms. The response rate for the organization survey is 31%. This
means that 69% of the organizations sampled did not respond to the survey.
This study examines whether the organizational survey sample is representative of
the population vis-à-vis employee size. There is no way of knowing if this sample is
representative on non-observables like the mitigation and preparedness activities that
non-respondents could have engaged in over the past year. This study conducts a
difference of means tests to know if the sample mean (μ 1) is different than the population
mean (μ2). Below are the null and alternative hypotheses.
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H0: μ1 - μ2 = 0
H1: μ1 - μ2 ≠ 0.
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CHAPTER IV: EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Chapter IV presents the results of the descriptive and quantitative analyses. This
chapter begins with a description of individual respondents. Next, it answers three
questions: (i) Which disasters are organizations worried about? (ii) What mitigation and
preparedness activities do organizations typically engage in? (iii) Do organizations use
disaster information in decision-making? Then, it presents the results of the bivariate
analysis and the Tobit regression, which answers the question “what are the determinants
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” This chapter concludes by
discussing the results of the Heckman approach, the specification tests and the results of
other additional analyses.

Descriptive Statistics of Respondents
Table 4.1. Minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation for individual
respondents

Age of respondent
Number of years of residence
in Memphis/Shelby County
Number of years on current
position within organization
Number of years of formal
education

N
211

Minimum
22

Maximum
84

Mean
49.77

Std.
Dev.
10.54

216

0

76

32.97

18.15

217

0

52

11.69

10.78

216

2

25

15.96

3.34

Table 4.1 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation values
for age, years of residence, years in current position within the organization, and years of
formal education for the respondent individuals. The average age is 50 years. The
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youngest respondent is 22 years old while the oldest respondent is 84 years old. The
mean number of years in Memphis is 33 years and the mean number of years in current
position within the organization is 12 years. Some respondents have been in their current
positions within their organizations less than a year while one respondent has been in a
current position for 52 years. The average educational level for the respondents is 16
years.

Disaster Worry Levels among Memphis/Shelby County Organizations
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Figure 4.1. Mean worry levels for different disasters.

Figure 4.1 shows the perceived mean worry level of Memphis/Shelby County
organizations for 15 different disasters. According to Figure 4.1, the perception is that
Memphis/Shelby County organizations are most worried about earthquakes. The threat
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posed by the New Madrid Fault may be one of many reasons for this result. The mean
worry level for earthquakes is 50.6 (out of a possible 100). One possible explanation for
this result is that Memphis/Shelby organizations are aware of USGS prediction of more
than 90% probability of a moderate earthquake (magnitude 6-7) hitting the NMSZ within
the next 50 years (USGS, 1998). Another interpretation is that this result may be an
indication of response bias. In other words, respondent organizations may have inflated
their responses regarding disaster worry levels for earthquakes because they may be
aware that the research team was interested in earthquake issues. After earthquakes, an
average Memphis/Shelby County organization is worried about extreme winds/tornadoes
and violent crimes. Conversely, an average Memphis/Shelby County organization is least
worried about drought, hurricanes, and water pollution.
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Figure 4.2. Median worry levels for different disasters.

57

Figure 4.2 shows the perceived median worry level for all 15 disasters. Half of
respondents are above the median worry level for earthquakes, extreme winds/tornadoes,
and violent crimes. All the respondents reported a median worry level of zero for
hurricanes and droughts.
Table 4.2. Disaster types and worry levels among Memphis/Shelby County organizations.

Disaster Type
Earthquakes
Extreme
winds/tornadoes
Violent Crimes
Fires
Severe storms
Ice Storms
Bird
Flu/Pandemics
Terrorist attacks
Extreme heat
Chemical spills
Toxic releases
Flooding
Water pollution
Hurricanes
Drought

No
worry at
all (%)
12

Moderate
worry
(%)
20

A great deal
of worry
(%)
15

95%
Conf.
Interval
46.0
55.2

Mean
50.6

11
13
19
15
14

20
15
17
21
17

9
13
8
6
4

48.5
47.2
41.3
40.1
37.8

44.2
42.6
36.8
36.1
33.7

52.7
51.7
45.8
44.1
41.8

33
30
33
40
38
38
43
64
59

14
12
11
10
7
11
8
3
4

6
5
2
4
4
1
4
3
0

29.8
26.3
25.4
24.7
23.8
21.5
18.1
12.9
8.9

25.4
22.4
21.5
20.6
19.8
18.0
14.6
9.5
6.7

34.2
30.2
29.3
28.8
27.8
25.0
21.6
16.3
11.2

Note: N=224

Table 4.2, which takes a closer look at the variance of worry levels for the 15
disasters reveals that 15% and 13% of respondents reported that earthquakes and violent
crimes are a great deal of worry to their organizations respectively. About 21% of
respondents say that severe storms pose moderate worry to their organizations.
Furthermore, 64% of respondent organizations say their organizations are not worried at
all about hurricanes while 59% say they are not worried at all about droughts.
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Figure 4.3. Mitigation and preparedness activities taken by organizations in
Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee.
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Mitigation and preparedness Activities in Organizations
Figure 4.3 shows the 10 disaster mitigation and preparedness activities ranked in a
descending according to the proportion of responding organizations that engaged in each
activity. The activities engaged in most by Memphis/Shelby County organizations over
the past year are “mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational meeting” (69%)
followed by “discussed in an organizational meeting short-term responses to disasters”
(64%). These two activities involve low effort. This result is consistent with that of
Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) who found that almost 4 in every 10 respondents
attended meetings/received written information.
About 57% of these organizations engaged in non-structural mitigation (e.g.,
securing computers) over the past year. The same number assessed or evaluated
vulnerability to disasters or estimated potential losses from disasters over the past year.
These two activities seem to require high level of effort. The least mentioned activity is
“engaged in structural mitigation measures”, which is probably the most effortdemanding measure, with about 25% reported engagement in this activity over the past
year.

Organizations and Use of Disaster Information
Out of the 733 organizations surveyed, 216 of them responded to the question
regarding the use of disaster information. About 61% of respondents said they use
disaster-related information in making decisions. This number seems high and may be an
indication of selection bias.
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Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables
Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables with recoded
values

Variable Description
Obs
Total number of mitigation and
preparedness activities (DV)
225
Mean disaster impact
225
Mean obstacles
225
Mean obstacle squared
225
Single location organization
218
Employee size
215
Educational sector
225
Health sector
225
Wholesale/Retail sector
225

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

4.34
3.29
1.88
5.29
0.78
3.86
0.08
0.16
0.15

3.40
1.27
1.33
5.28
1.87
-

0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

10
5
5
25
1
7
1
1
1

Note: I replaced non-responses with zeroes for total number of mitigation and
preparedness activities. In addition, I replaced non-responses and “not applicable”
responses with zeroes for mean disaster impact and mean obstacles.

Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics for dependent and independent
variables. On average, Memphis/Shelby County organization engaged in 4.3 of the 10
possible mitigation and preparedness activities (43%). On the one hand, my result may be
an indication that Memphis/Shelby County organizations are actually doing more to
mitigate and prepare for disasters than previous studies suggest (e.g., Dahlhamer &
D’Souza, 1997). On the other hand, this result may have been inflated due to sample bias.
In other words, the organizational survey data may show a preponderance of
organizations that engaged in mitigation and preparedness activities over those that did
not.
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Table 4.4. Variance of different types of disaster impact

Types of Disaster Impact
Damaged reputation
Disruption in supplies and
deliveries
Inability to communicate with
employees
Inadequate number of
employees
Loss of commercial goods
Loss of customers
Loss of data
Loss of life
Loss of life support (food,
water, etc.)
Loss relative to competitor's
loss
Power outage
Structural damage
Transportation disruption

0
7

1
14

2
10

3
13

4
20

5 Obs
37
213

4

5

8

21

19

43

217

2

5

4

18

37

34

218

2
12
5
0
1

10
14
10
5
2

7
18
5
7
5

23
23
12
19
9

29
16
17
33
16

29
17
51
36
66

217
217
219
218
217

3

5

7

10

25

50

215

16
0
0
0

17
3
2
7

13
7
3
9

28
21
21
24

16
28
32
29

10
41
42
31

216
219
217
217

Note: All the values are percentages. The column for zero represents
the percentage of respondents that said the impact was not applicable to
their organizations or those that did not answer the question.

Table 4.4 takes a closer look at disaster impact. Recall in the previous chapter that
scales1and 2 represent minor adverse impact, scale 3 represents moderate adverse impact
and scales 4 and 5 represent major adverse impact. This table indicates that 7% of
organizations reported that damaged reputation is not applicable to their organization or
simply did not answer this question. However, among respondents, 24% (categories 1 &
2) and 13% of respondent organizations said that damaged reputation has minor and
moderate adverse impacts on their organizations respectively. Furthermore, 57%
(categories 4 & 5) reported that damaged reputation has a major adverse impact on their
organizations. The disaster impact with the highest percentage on major adverse impact is

62

loss of life (82%) followed by loss of life support (75%), while that with the lowest
percentage is loss relative to competitor’s loss (26%) followed by loss of commercial
goods (33%).
Respondents view organizational obstacles as minor impediments to disaster
planning (1.88). Single-location organizations represent 78% of all respondent
organizations. This number is comparable to the proportion of single-location
organizations in the sampling frame (71%). However, this number is different from the
31% found by Dahlhamer & D’Souza (1997). About 8% of respondent organizations
belong to the educational sector. Twice this number belongs to the health sector and 15%
of respondent organizations constitute the wholesale/retail sector. In contrast to
Dahlhamer & D’Souza’s (1997) study, 27% of organizations belonged to the
wholesale/retail sector.
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Table 4.5. Variance of organizational obstacles
Independent Variables
(Obstacles)
Lack of financial resources
to prepare for disasters
Lack of convincing
information about the
potential impacts of
disasters
Lack of information about
the frequency and
magnitude disasters
Unclear organizational
benefits from disaster
planning and mitigation
Lack of support from midand lower-level
organizational members
Lack of support from
upper-level management
within your organization

0
%

1
(Minor)
%

4
%

5
(Major)
%

2
%

3
%

Total
%

9

17

17

24

11

21

99

13

24

12

23

18

10

100

13

23

16

24

13

10

99

14

28

16

20

13

10

101

20

35

20

18

4

3

100

19

42

16

12

4

7

100

Note: The total percentages for some of the obstacle do not sum to 100 because of
rounding. The zero column represents the percentage of respondents that said the obstacle
was not applicable to their organizations or those organizations that did not answer the
question. N=225

In this section, I take a closer look at the descriptive statistics for organizational
obstacle. Table 4.5 shows the variance and means for the six organizational obstacles.
Recall in the previous chapter that scales1and 2 represent minor obstacle, scale 3
represents moderate obstacle, and scales 4 and 5 represent major obstacles. This table
indicates that 9% of organizations reported that lack of financial resources to prepare for
disasters is not applicable to their organization or simply did not answer this question.
However, among respondents, 34% (categories 1 & 2) and 24% of respondent
organizations said that lack of financial resources to prepare for disasters is a minor and
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moderate obstacle to disaster planning within their organizations respectively.
Furthermore, 32% (categories 4 & 5) reported that it is a major obstacle to disaster
planning within their organizations. About 55% of organizations said lack of support
from mid- and lower-level organizational members and about 58% said lack of support
from upper-level management within the organization are minor obstacles to disaster
planning.
In general, one in every three respondents perceives lack of financial resources to
prepare for disasters are major obstacles to disaster planning within their organization.
While one in four respondents perceives lack of convincing information about the
potential impacts of disasters are major obstacles to disaster planning within their
organization. At least, one in every three respondents says all six obstacles pose a minor
problem to disaster planning in their organizations.

Correlation between the Dependent and Independent Variables
Before discussing the results of the multivariate regression, I discuss the results of
the correlations between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The goal
is to understand the association between the dependent variable and each of the
independent variables.
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Table 4.6. Pairwise correlations between dependent and independent variables

Meanimpact
Meanobstacle
Meanobstacle2
Single
Empsize
Education
Health
Wholesale/retail

Totactivity
0.218***
0.084
-0.015
-0.270***
0.485***
0.188***
0.120*
-0.273***

Observation
225
225
225
218
215
225
225
225

***significance at 0.01 level
**significance at 0.05 level
*significance at 0.1 level

Table 4.6 shows that there is a positive association between mitigation and
preparedness and disaster impact, organizational obstacles, employee size, organizations
in the educational sector, and organizations in the health sector. Conversely, there is a
negative association between mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacle 2,
single location organizations as well as organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. All
the correlation coefficients are significant except for the correlation coefficient on
organizational obstacle and organizational obstacle 2.
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Results of the Tobit Analyses
Table 4.7. Summary of results
Total number of
mitigation &
preparedness
activities (DV)

Tobit with
recoded
Values (Base
model)
(n=215)
Pseudo R2=
0.107

Tobit with
missing
values
(n=146)

OLS with
recoded
values
(n=215)

OLS with
missing
values
(n=146)

Pseudo R2 =
0.115

R2 = 0.413

R2 = 0.433

0.53 (0.20)***

0.17 (0.37)

0.35 (0.15)**

0.17 (0.30)

1.03 (0.54)*

-1.35 (1.45)

0.76 (0.41)*

-0.90 (1.19)

Mean obstacle2

-0.33 (0.14)**

0.12 (0.27)

-0.25 (0.10)**

0.06 (0.22)

Single location
organization

-2.71 (0.61)***

-2.89 (0.63)***

-2.13 (0.47)***

-2.38
(0.53)***

0.84 (0.13)***

0.85 (0.15)***

0.66 (0.10)***

0.69
(0.12)***

Educational
sector

3.02 (0.89)***

2.59 (0.85)***

2.49 (0.69)***

2.26
(0.71)***

Health sector

1.71 (0.67)**

0.92 (0.77)

1.22 (0.52)**

0.73 (0.64)

Wholesale/
Retail sector

-2.20 (0.70)***

-3.50 (0.79)***

-1.54 (0.51)***

-2.50
(0.62)***

Mean disaster
impact
Mean obstacle

Employee size

Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
***significance at 0.01 level
**significance at 0.05 level
*significance at 0.1 level

This section presents the results of the base Tobit model with recoded values
(sample size = 215). Table 4.7 indicates that this model and all the independent variables
are statistically significant. I cannot interpret the Tobit coefficients as effect sizes.
Therefore, I focus on the signs and significance of the coefficients in the following
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paragraphs. Later, I interpret the marginal effects of the independent variables on the
dependent variable. The Tobit result suggests that there is a positive significant
association between mitigation and preparedness and concern over disaster impacts,
organizational obstacle, employee size, and organizations in the educational and health
sectors.
Employee size is the most significant predictor of mitigation and preparedness in
this study. The larger the organization the more likely it is to have engaged in mitigation
and preparedness activities in the past year. This finding is in accordance with that of
previous studies. For instance, Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that larger companies were
more likely to engage in more planning than smaller companies did. Similarly, in a study
of disaster evacuation planning in the tourist industry, Drabek (1991, 1994a, 1994b)
found that firms with more employees had more extensive disaster evacuation plans than
firms with less employees did. One reason for the positive relationship between
organizational size and mitigation and preparedness is that larger organizations have the
necessary resources, such as staff and time, to adopt or institute mitigation and
preparedness measures (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).
Memphis/Shelby County organizations that were concerned about disaster
impacts engaged in mitigation and preparedness activities over the past year. Similarly,
one could argue that the more disaster mitigation and preparedness activities an
organization engages in, the lower the concern about disaster impact. In other words,
there is may be simultaneity between mitigation and preparedness and concern about
disaster impact. However, the positive association between mitigation and preparedness
activities and concern about disaster impact in the data casts doubt on such a negative
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relationship. Furthermore, past disaster studies at the household level have found similar
positive relationships. For instance, in her study of the effect of the Iben Browning
earthquake prediction, Showalter (1993) found a positive relationship between concern
over loss of life and personal injury and respondents’ willingness to engage in
preparedness activities. Furthermore, organizations in the educational and health sectors
are more likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness than organizations in other
sectors.
The coefficients on meanobstacle and meanobstacle2 show that there is a positive
association between mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles until
meanobstacle peaks at 1.56 and then the association becomes negative. The perception of
respondents is that increases in the level of organizational obstacle lead to increases in the
number of mitigation and preparedness activities adopted until organizational obstacle
peaks at 1.56 where further increases in organizational obstacle lead to decreases in the
number of mitigation and preparedness activities engaged in over the past year.
Mitigation and preparedness = 1.03 meanobstacle – (0.33) meanobstacle2
Δ mitigation and preparedness/ Δ meanobstacle = 1.03 – 2(0.33) meanobstacle
Δ mitigation and preparedness/ Δ meanobstacle = 1.03 – 0.66 meanobstacle
1.03 – 0.66 Meanobstacle = 0
Meanobstacle = 1.03/0.66 = 1.56

The result also indicates that mitigation and preparedness activities are negatively
associated with single location organizations. This result is in line with that of previous
research. For instance, Drabek (1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995) found that firms that were part
of a larger chain engaged in more disaster evacuation planning than single firms did.
Similarly, Quarantelli et al. (1979) found that national chemical companies engaged in
more preparedness than single local chemical firms did. This finding may be due to the
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mandates given to local chapters by corporate headquarters to engage in disaster
preparedness (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).
Furthermore, this study finds a negative significant relationship between
mitigation and preparedness and organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. Dahlhamer
& D’Souza (1997) also found a negative but insignificant relationship between
organizations in the wholesale/retail sector and disaster preparedness. In sum, the signs
from the bivariate analysis are similar to those of the multivariate analysis.
The marginal effects are the same as the Tobit coefficients. The independent
variable with the biggest marginal effect is education followed by single, then
wholesale/retail. The independent variable with the smallest marginal effect is disaster
impact followed by employee size.
A unit increase in the level of disaster impact leads to 0.53 unit increase in
expected mitigation and preparedness holding other variables at their means. Each
additional increase in the level of organizational obstacle from minor obstacle to major
obstacle increases expected mitigation and preparedness by 1.03 units until
organizational obstacle peaks at 1.56, after which additional increases in organizational
obstacle lead to a decrease in expected mitigation and preparedness, holding other
variables at their means. Holding all other variables at their means, single location
organizations decrease expected mitigation and preparedness by about 2.71 units. A unit
increase in employee size leads to 0.84 unit increase in expected mitigation and
preparedness holding other variables at their means. While organizations in the
wholesale/retail trade decrease expected mitigation and preparedness by about 2.20 units,
organizations in the educational sector and health sector increase expected mitigation and
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preparedness by about 3.02 and 1.71 units respectively, holding other variables at their
means.

Comparing the Tobit Results from the Initial and Final Samples
In this section, I compare the outputs from two Tobit models (see Table 4.7). The
first output is from the base Tobit model and the second is from the initial sample with
missing values (sample size = 146). The reason for comparing these two outputs is to
ascertain if the recoding has any effect on the relationships between the dependent and
independent variables.
The independent variables from both outputs have the same signs except for
organizational obstacle and organizational obstacle2. Organizational obstacle is positive
in the base model and negative in the second Tobit while the reverse is the case for
organizational obstacle2. Although, both models are significant, they are different in some
respects. First, the variables disaster impact, organizational obstacle, organizational
obstacle2, and health sector are significant in the base model and not in the second Tobit.
After the recoding, there appears to be an increase in the standard errors of the second
Tobit coefficients (except the standard error on educational sector). The smaller sample
size (n=146) and more restricted variation in the independent variables (I replaced the
actual values, which may range from 1-5, with zeroes) are two possible reasons for the
increased standard errors in the second Tobit output.
In sum, the recoding resulted in sign changes and made four independent
variables become significant. It is difficult to say which of the two Tobit models is better.
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However, it is clear that based on the value of the Pseudo R2 the Tobit model with
missing values has a slightly better fit.

Comparing the Tobit Output with the OLS Regression Output
In this section, I compare the output of the base model and that of the OLS
regression (Table 4.7) based on the sample with recoded values (sample size = 215). The
reason for this comparison is to know if OLS could have yielded similar result. The
results from both analyses are quite similar. In general, both models are significant and
all the independent variables from both models have the same signs. Furthermore, all the
independent variables in both models are significant. However, the coefficients from the
base model are larger than the respective ones from the OLS regression.
I also compare the second Tobit model and the OLS regression outputs based on
the original data with missing values (N=146). These two models are significant and the
same dependent variables in both models are significant. Similarly, the same dependent
variables are insignificant. All the Tobit coefficients are larger than their OLS
counterparts except for the coefficients on disaster impact.
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Result of the Heckman Approach
Table 4.8. Heckman output
Number of obs = 645
Censored obs
= 448
Uncensored obs = 197
Wald chi2(7)
= 125.02
Log likelihood
= -854.6438
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000
Total number of mitigation
and preparedness activities
(DV)
Mean disaster impact

Coefficient

Std. error

0.43 ***
-0.18

0.15
0.14

Mean obstacle
Single location organization
Employee size

-1.49*
.82***

0.88
0.13

Educational sector

2.43***

0.74

Health sector
1.50***
Wholesale/Retail sector
-1.58***
Select
Zip1
0.22
Zip2
0.24
Zip3
0.17
Zipp4
0.44
Zip5
0.49
Empsize
0.05*
Single
0.42***
_cons
-1.27
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.27
chi2 = 0.6030

0.55
0.57
0.81
0.82
0.83
0.80
0.85
0.03
0.12
0.83
Prob >

***significance at 0.01 level
**significance at 0.05 level
*significance at 0.1 level

Based on the results of the descriptive statistics my initial expectation was that
organizations that engaged in mitigation and preparedness activities are more likely to
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answer the survey than organizations that did not engage in mitigation and preparedness
activities. To correct this potential problem, this study uses the Heckman approach.
Table 4.8 shows that the result of the Heckman is generally consistent with that of
the base Tobit model discussed earlier. Both models are significant and all the
independent variables from both models have the same signs. In addition, all the
independent variables in both models are significant except for organizational obstacle,
which is significant in the base model and insignificant in the Heckman model.
The effect of more employees increases the probability of selection (answering a
survey) and the predicted engagement in mitigation and preparedness activities
conditional on participating in the survey. The effect of being a single location
organization increases the probability of selection (answering a survey) and decreases the
predicted engagement in mitigation and preparedness activities conditional on answering
in the survey.
The null hypothesis for the Heckman model is that there is no selection bias in the
sample. The likelihood-ratio test of independent equations (rho = 0) is not significant,
meaning that I fail to reject the null hypothesis. In sum, while the descriptive statistics
may have suggested sample bias, the Heckman result did not indicate that this problem
exists in the organizational survey data.
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Result of the Sample Representative Test
The result of the difference of means tests reveals that there is no statistical
difference between the population mean and the sample mean. The implication is that the
organizational survey sample is representative of the population based on employee size
alone. However, I cannot say anything about the representativeness of the organizational
survey sample based on unobservable characteristics like the mitigation and preparedness
activities adopted.

Result of the Specification Test: Non-linearity
I performed a RESET Test on the data with the aim of investigating whether the
relationship between the dependent variable and any of the independent variables is nonlinear. I started by creating the squared term for all the independent variables and then
tested if these squared terms belong to the model or not (Stata dropped all dummy
variables because of perfect collinearity). The null hypothesis is that none of the squared
terms of all the independent variables belongs in the model. The result of the F-test
revealed that meanobstacles2 belongs in the model. Consequently, I adjusted my model
by including meanobstacles2.

Result of the Specification Test: Omitted Variable
This study performs a LINK test to the mitigation and preparedness model to
ascertain if Tobit is the appropriate function to use and if the model has omitted
important determinant(s). If my model is specified properly, there should not be any
additional determinant(s) that would be significant in my model except by chance. What
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the LINK test does is to rebuild my model using the linear predicted values (_hat) and the
linear predicted value squared (_hatsq). The result of the linktest indicates that the linear
predicted value is a statistically significant predictor and the linear predicted value
squared is not a statistically significant predictor. Since the linear predicted value squared
is not significant, the LINK test is not significant. Although, the result indicates that my
model uses the appropriate function and there are no omitted variables, still there may be
problems with the model that the LINK test failed to detect.

Results of the Additional Analyses
I employed two additional variables - use of disaster information and availability
of a risk manager - in the organizational survey data as proxies for the dependent
variable. The correlation between the initial dependent variable, total number of
mitigation and preparedness activity and use of disaster information and availability of
risk manager are 0.63 and 0.57 respectively. Organizations that used disaster information
are coded 1 and those that did not are coded 0. Similarly, organizations that have a risk
manager are coded 1 while those that do not have a risk manager are coded 0. I ran two
Logit regressions, one for each of the two proxies, on the same dependent variables as in
the previous analyses. Logit is the appropriate model because of the dichotomous nature
of these proxies.
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Table 4.9. Comparing the results from three different models
Base model
(n=215)
Total number
of mitigation &
preparedness
activities (DV)

Logit (n=189)
Use of disaster
information
(DV)a

Logit (n=198)
Presence of
risk manager
(DV)

0.53 (0.20)***

0.29 (0.15)*

1.03 (0.54)*

0.35 (0.39)

0.08 (0.15)
0.10
0.51 (0.38)
0.57

-0.33 (0.14)**

-0.06 (0.09)

-0.14 (0.10)
-0.55

-2.71 (0.61)***

-1.94 (0.53)***

-1.78
(0.43)***
-0.42

0.84 (0.13)***

0.30 (0.10)***

0.27
(0.09)***
0.38

3.02 (0.89)***

----b

2.27
(0.70)***
0.48

1.71 (0.67)**

1.33 (0.52)***

0.49 (0.45)
0.12

-2.20 (0.70)***

-.2.74
(0.68)***

-1.10 (0.56)*
-0.24

Mean disaster impact
Mean obstacles

Mean obstacle squared

Single location
organization

Employee size

Educational sector

hHealth sector
Wholesale/Retail
sector
a

Stata could not produce the predicted probabilities for use of disaster information.
Stata dropped educational sector for predicting success perfectly.
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors and predicted probabilities in bold print.
The Tobit coefficients are the same as the marginal values.
***significance at 0.01 level
**significance at 0.05 level
*significance at 0.10 level
b
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Table 4.9 compares the results from these two Logit models with that of the base
model and shows the predicted probabilities for the risk manager model. The result of the
first Logit analysis with use of disaster information as the dependent variable indicates
that the model is significant. All the significant variables in the base model are also
significant in the first Logit analysis, except organizational obstacle and organizational
obstacle2. Stata dropped educational sector for predicting success perfectly. In addition,
all the independent variables have the same signs in both models. In general, the sizes of
the coefficients are smaller in the Logit output except the coefficient on wholesale/retail
sector.
The result of the second Logit analysis with risk manager as the dependent
variable shows that the model is significant. In the base model, all the independent
variables are significant. However, in the second Logit output four independent variablesdisaster impact, organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle2, and health sector-are
insignificant. Furthermore, all the independent variables have the same signs in both
models and the Logit coefficients are smaller than their counterparts are in the base
model.
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Table 4.10. Comparing the outputs from the active, passive, and base models
Total number of mitigation
& preparedness activities
(DV)

Tobit with
recoded
Values (Base
model)
(n=215)

Active
measures
(n=199)

Passive
measures
(n=205)

Mean disaster impact

0.53 (0.20)***
1.03 (0.54)*

0.24 (0.16)
0.10 (0.39)

-0.00 (0.08)
0.32 (0.21)

-0.33 (0.14)**

-0.10 (0.10)

-0.10 (0.05)*

-2.71 (0.61)***

-1.68 (0.42)***

-1.12 (0.23)***

Employee size

0.84 (0.13)***

0.61 (0.10)***

0.31 (0.05)***

Educational sector

3.02 (0.89)***

1.92 (0.63)***

0.94 (0.34)***

Health sector

1.71 (0.67)**

0.20 (0.47)

0.77 (0.26)***

Wholesale/
Retail sector

-2.20 (0.70)***

-2.24 (0.50)

-0.85 (0.28)**

Mean obstacle
Mean obstacle2
Single location organization

***significance at 0.01 level
**significance at 0.05 level
*significance at 0.10 level

Table 4.10 presents the outputs from active, passive, and the base models. In the
base model, all the independent variables are significant. However, when the 10
mitigation and preparedness activities were grouped into active and passive measures and
two Tobit regressions were run, the results are different. The following variables are
insignificant in the active measure model-concern over disaster impact, organizational
obstacles, organizations in the health sector and organizations in the wholesale/retail
sector. In other words, these four independent variables are not significant determinants
of active measures to address disaster risks in organizations. In the passive measure
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model, concern over disaster impact and organizational obstacles are not significant
determinants of passive measures to address disaster risks in organizations.
In addition to the above analyses, I examine each of the mitigation and
preparedness activities individually using the same independent variables as in the
previous analyses. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the relationships between
each of the mitigation and preparedness activity and each of the independent variables.
Table 4.11 shows changes in the predicted probabilities from 10 Logit models for all the
mitigation and preparedness activities. I arranged the mitigation and preparedness
activities from top to bottom in a decreasing order of significance and the dependent
variables from left to right in a decreasing order of significance. Table 4.11 indicates that
the most significant dependent variable is employee size followed by single location. In
fact, employee size is significant and positive in all the 10 activities. Single location is
significant in all but one activity and has a negative sign in all the activities. At the
bottom of the table are organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle 2, and disaster
impact, which are insignificant in all but one activity each. A unit increase in employee
size leads to a 69 percentage point increase in the probability of holding
workshops/training courses, holding all other variables constant at their means.
In sum, these results differ from that of the base model. Recall that in the base
model, all the independent variables are significant. In this Logit models, only four of the
eight independent variables (employee size, single location, wholesale/retail, and
education) are significant in at least 5 of the 10 mitigation and preparedness activities.
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Table 4.11. Changes in Predicted Probabilities for disaster mitigation and
preparedness activities from Logit models
Emp
size
Held
0.69
workshops ***

Single
-0.29
***

Whole.
/Retail
-0.41
***

Educ.
0.30
**

Health

Mean
impact

Mean
obst.2
-0.69
**

Mean
obst.
0.72
*

0.11

-0.05

Long-term
Recovery

0.64
***

-0.43
***

-0.40
***

0.29
**

0.13

-0.03

-0.57

0.55

Mentioned
Disaster

0.41
***

-0.24
***

-0.23
**

0.19
*

0.21
**

0.02

-0.55

0.33

Vuln.
Ass’t

0.39
***

-0.24
**

-0.36
***

0.35
**

0.01

0.19

-0.57` 0.28

Attended
Meeting

0.63
***

-0.25
**

-0.37
***

0.27
*

0.20
*

0.13

-0.37

0.31

Short-term 0.56
Response ***

-0.31
***

-0.13

0.20
*

0.22
**

0.03

-0.7

0.43

Site Visit

0.40
***

-0.30
***

-0.18
**

0.22
*

-0.06

0.05

-0.33

0.2

Provided
Info.

0.22
**

-0.22
**

-0.24
**

0.53
***

-0.09

0.18

0.57

-0.36

NonStructural
Mitigation

0.41
***

-0.19
**

-0.09

0.1

0.15

0.33
**

-0.28

0.17

Structural
Mitigation

0.25
***

-0.09

-0.20
**

0.03

-0.05

0.00

-0.13

-0.07

Note: The numbers indicate changes in predicted probability of the dependent variable as
the independent variables change from their minimum to their maximum holding other
independent variables at their means.
***significance at 0.01 level
**significance at 0.05 level
*significance at 0.10 level
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Finally, I replaced mean disaster obstacle with each of the 13 disaster impacts and
ran 13 different Tobit regressions on the same independent variables as in the base
model. Only four of the 13 disaster impacts are significant with the expected positive
signs-inability to communicate with employees, inadequate number of employees, loss of
life, and transportation disruption.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of this study. It
begins by reiterating the research questions and summarizing the results. Next, it
discusses the findings in the context of previous research and examines the policy
implications of the results. The chapter ends by discussing some limitations and
recommendations for future research.
The main goal of this study is to answer the question “what are the determinants
of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational level?” The following four subquestions provide good basis for exploring this question. (i) Does concern over disaster
impact lead to more mitigation and preparedness? (ii) What is the relationship between
mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles? (iii) Do single location
organizations engage in less mitigation and preparedness than other types of
organizations? (iv) Does organizational size have a positive effect on mitigation and
preparedness? In order to answer the question regarding the determinants of mitigation
and preparedness in organizations, this study utilizes four independent variables - concern
over disaster impacts, organizational obstacles, ownership patterns of organizations, and
organizational size. In addition, this study includes three variables as controls for
organizational sector: education, health, and wholesale/retail trade. In addition to this
main research question, I explore three other questions. (i) Which disasters are
organizations worried about? (ii) Which mitigation and preparedness activities do
organizations typically engage in? (iii) Do organizations use disaster information in
decision-making?
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Disaster Worry Levels among Memphis/Shelby County Organizations
The perception according to respondents is that earthquakes pose the greatest
threat to Memphis/Shelby County organizations. This suggests that Memphis/Shelby
County organizations may be aware of the danger that can result from the New Madrid
Fault Zone. Another interpretation is that this result may be an indication of response
bias; respondents may have inflated their responses regarding disaster worry levels for
earthquakes because they may be aware that the research team was interested in
earthquake issues. Conversely, more than half of responds reported that they are not
worried at all about hurricanes and drought. In addition, severe storms pose moderate
worry to Memphis/Shelby County organizations.
Half of respondents are above the median worry level for earthquakes, extreme
winds/tornadoes, and violent crimes. All the respondents reported a median worry level
of zero for hurricanes and droughts.

Mitigation and Preparedness Activities in Organizations
The activities engaged in most by Memphis/Shelby County organizations during
the past year involve meetings. In particular, these organizations are most likely to
mention a potential disaster or discuss short-term responses to disasters in an
organizational meeting over the past year. These activities involve low effort. This result
is consistent with that of Dahlhamer and D’Souza (1997) who found that attending
meetings/receiving written information is common among Memphis organizations.
Approximately 6 out of every 10 organizations engaged in non-structural
mitigation (e.g., securing computers) over the past year. The same number assessed or
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evaluated vulnerability to disasters or estimated potential losses from disasters during the
past year. These two activities require higher level of effort when compared to holding
meetings. The least activity Memphis/Shelby County organizations engaged in during the
past year is structural mitigation, which is probably the most effort-demanding measure.
An average organization in Memphis/Shelby County engaged in about half of the
mitigation and preparedness activities over the past year. This result refutes the claim by
prior research on the low level of preparedness in Memphis (e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza,
1997). It is noteworthy that this result may have been inflated as a result of sample bias.

Organizations and Use of Disaster Information
Six out of every 10 Memphis/Shelby County organizations use disaster-related
information to make decisions within their organizations. This result suggests that
Memphis/Shelby County organizations are receptive to disaster-related information that
can aid them in their disaster plans.

Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables
On average, Memphis/Shelby County organization engaged in 4.3 of the 10
possible mitigation and preparedness activities. This result may be an indication that
Memphis/Shelby County organizations are actually doing more to mitigate and prepare
for disasters than previous studies suggest (e.g., Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).
Respondents reported that disaster impacts have a moderate adverse impact on
their organizations (3.29). The disaster impact with the highest percentage on major
adverse impact is loss of life (82%) followed by loss of life support (75%), while that

85

with the lowest percentage is loss relative to competitor’s loss (26%) followed by loss of
commercial goods (33%). In addition, respondents view organizational obstacles as
minor impediments to disaster planning (1.88). Single-location organizations represent
78% of all respondent organizations. This number is comparable to the proportion of
single-location organizations in the sampling frame (71%). About 8% of respondent
organizations belong to the educational sector. Twice this number belongs to the health
sector and 15% of respondent organizations constitute the wholesale/retail sector. In
contrast to Dahlhamer & D’Souza’s (1997) study, 27% of organizations belonged to the
wholesale/retail sector.
In general, 1 in every 3 respondents perceives lack of financial resources to
prepare for disasters are major obstacles to disaster planning within their organization.
While one in four respondents perceives lack of convincing information about the
potential impacts of disasters are major obstacles to disaster planning within their
organization. At least, 1 in every 3 respondents says all 6 obstacles pose a minor problem
to disaster planning in their organizations.

The Result of the Correlation Analysis
Before discussing the results of the multivariate regression, I briefly examine the
result of the correlation analysis between the dependent variable and the independent
variables. This study finds that there is a positive association between mitigation and
preparedness and disaster impact, organizational obstacles, employee size, organizations
in the educational sector, and organizations in the health sector. In addition, there is a
negative association between mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacle 2,
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single location, as well as organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. All the correlation
coefficients are significant except for the correlation coefficient on organizational
obstacle and organizational obstacle2.

The Determinants of Organizational Mitigation and Preparedness
The multivariate Tobit analysis result reveals that there is a significant positive
relationship between mitigation and preparedness and organizational size. In other words,
the smaller the organization the fewer the number of mitigation and preparedness
activities adopted. This finding is in accordance with that of previous research (e.g.,
Quarantelli et al., 1979; Drabek, 1994a, 1994b, 1995; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997).
Some disaster studies have explained the positive association between mitigation and
preparedness and organizational size in terms of unavailability of resources. In fact, this
resource argument is common in the literature on disasters at the household (Mileti
1999), community (May & Birkland 1994; Wood, 2004), and organizational level (Mileti
et al., 1993; Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997; Tierney, 2006). That is smaller organizations
do not have the resources to invest in mitigation and preparedness. For example, smaller
organizations may not be able to hire a risk manager.
This study also finds that concern over disaster impact is a significant positive
determinant of mitigation and preparedness among Memphis/Shelby County
organizations. Ownership pattern of organizations is a significant determinant of
mitigation and preparedness in organizations. In other words, single location
organizations are less likely to engage in mitigation and preparedness when compared to
organizations with multiple locations. This result is in line with that of previous research
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(e.g., Quarantelli et al., 1979; Drabek, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995). One reason for this
finding is the mandates given to local chapters by corporate headquarters to engage in
disaster preparedness (Dahlhamer & D’Souza, 1997). Recall that about 8 in every 10
organizations in the sample is a single-location organization. The preponderance of
single-location organizations may have contributed to the moderate level of mitigation
and preparedness in Memphis/Shelby County.
This study finds a significant positive relationship between organizations in the
educational and health sectors and mitigation and preparedness. One interpretation of this
result is that educational and health sector organizations are more likely to engage in
mitigation and preparedness activities because they usually deal with vulnerable
populations like children, the old, and the sick. Conversely, there is a negative
relationship between mitigation and preparedness and organizations in the
wholesale/retail sector. One explanation is that organizations in the wholesale/retail
sector do not usually deal with vulnerable populations. This may be why they are less
likely than organizations in other sectors to mitigate and prepare for disasters. Dahlhamer
& D’Souza (1997) also found a negative insignificant relationship between preparedness
and organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. Furthermore, the coefficients on
meanobstacle and meanobstacle2 show that there is a positive association between
mitigation and preparedness and organizational obstacles until organizational obstacle
peaks and then the association becomes negative. Based on the results of the Tobit
regression, I reject the null hypotheses that there is no relationship between each of the
independent variables and the dependent variable.
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The marginal effects are the same as the Tobit coefficients. The independent
variable with the biggest marginal effect is education followed by single, then
wholesale/retail. The independent variable with the smallest marginal effect is disaster
impact followed by employee size.

Result of the Heckman Approach
Based on the results of the descriptive statistics my initial expectation was that
organizations that engaged in mitigation and preparedness are more likely to answer the
survey than organizations that did not engage in mitigation and preparedness. To correct
this potential problem, this study uses the Heckman approach. The result of the Heckman
analysis confirms that the organizational survey data does not suffer from selection bias
as earlier suggested by descriptive statistics.

Results of the Sample Representative Test and the Specification Tests
There is no statistical difference between the population mean and the sample
mean. This means that the organizational survey sample is representative of the
population based on employee size alone.
This study performs a RESET test on the data with the aim of investigating
whether the relationship between the dependent variable and any of the independent
variables is non-linear. The result of the F-test reveals that meanobstacles2 belongs in the
model. Therefore, I added meanobstacle2 to the model.
After the addition of meanobstacle2, this study performs a LINK test to ascertain
if Tobit is the appropriate function to use and if other determinants belong in the model.
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The result indicates that the model uses the appropriate function and there are no omitted
variables. It is important to note that passing these tests does not guarantee that the model
is properly specified.

Results of the Additional Analyses
I employed two variables - use of disaster information and availability of a risk
manager - within the organizational survey data as proxies for the dependent variable.
The correlation between the initial dependent variable, total number of mitigation and
preparedness activity and use of disaster information and availability of risk manager are
0.63 and 0.57 respectively. I ran two Logit regressions, one for each of the two proxies,
on the same dependent variables as in the previous analysis.
The result of the first Logit analysis with use of disaster information as the
dependent variable indicates that the model is significant. All the significant variables in
the Tobit analysis are also significant in this Logit analysis, except organizational
obstacle and organizational obstacle2. In addition, all the independent variables have the
same signs in both models. In general, the sizes of the coefficients are smaller in the
Logit output except the coefficient on wholesale/retail sector.
The result of the second Logit analysis with risk manager as the dependent
variable shows that the model is significant. In the Tobit output, all the independent
variables are significant. However, in the Logit output four independent variables-disaster
impact, organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle2, and health sector-are
insignificant. Furthermore, all the independent variables have the same signs in both
models and the Logit coefficients are smaller than those of the Tobit regression.
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In addition to the above analyses, I examine each of the mitigation and
preparedness activities individually using the same independent variables as in the
previous analyses. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of the relationships between
each of the mitigation and preparedness activity and each of the independent variables.
The most significant dependent variable is employee size followed by single location. In
fact, employee size is significant and positive in all the 10 activities. Single location is
significant in all but one activity and has a negative sign in all the activities. At the
bottom of the table are organizational obstacle, organizational obstacle 2, and disaster
impact, which are insignificant in all but one activity each. In sum, these results differ
from that of the Tobit model.
Finally, using total disaster impact instead of mean disaster impact did not change
the initial Tobit result. Similarly, the results of the analyses involving each of the 13
disaster impacts in lieu of mean disaster impact show that four of the 13 disaster impacts
are significant with the expected positive signs-inability to communicate with employees,
inadequate number of employees, loss of life, and transportation disruption.
In the base Tobit model, all the independent variables are significant. However,
when the 10 mitigation and preparedness activities were grouped into active and passive
measures, the results are different. The following variables are insignificant in the active
measure model-concern over disaster impact, organizational obstacles, organizations in
the health sector and organizations in the wholesale/retail sector. In the passive measure
model, concern over disaster impact and organizational obstacles are not significant
determinants of passive measures to address disaster risks in organizations.
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Contributions to the Literature
In Chapter II, this study highlights the contributions made by previous disaster
studies and emphasizes the gap in the disaster literature regarding the determinants of
organizational mitigation and preparedness. The discussion reveals that there is no theory
to guide research on the determinants of mitigation and preparedness at the organizational
level of analysis. Knowledge of these determinants can help to understand the factors that
are instrumental in motivating organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness
measures. This study attempts to narrow this gap by studying the determinants of
organizational mitigation and preparedness for disasters among Memphis/Shelby County
organizations.
In Chapter III, this study develops a theoretical model from prior research on
business disaster preparedness (e.g., Quarantelli et al., 1979; Dahlhamer & D’Souza,
1997; Webb et al., 2000) and earthquake preparedness at the household level (e.g., Nigg,
1986; Showalter, 1993). This theoretical model has its strengths and weaknesses. A
cursory look at its strengths reveals that it is simple, clear, and logical. This model is a
simple representation of reality. The relationships between the independent variables and
the dependent variable are clear and easy to understand. The expected signs of the
relationships between the dependent and independent variables are logical. For example,
it is reasonable to expect a positive relationship between mitigation and preparedness and
concern over the disaster impact. Based on the RESET and LINK tests, it does appear
that the model is properly specified. A weakness of this model is the uncertainty
surrounding how it will behave when used to analyze other datasets. The limitation of
this model notwithstanding, I am optimistic it can aid future research in gaining a deeper
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understanding of the factors that motivate organizations to mitigate and prepare for
disasters.
Although, this study is guided by prior research, it extends previous studies by
investigating a new variable as a determinant of organizational mitigation and
preparedness for disasters. This variable is organizational obstacle.

Policy Implications
Organizations concerned over the impact of disasters seem to be more likely than
those that are not to mitigate and prepare for disasters. This result has an implication for
policymaking by suggesting that governments may be able to design and implement
computer programs capable of estimating different type of disaster losses, such as loss of
live and property. This result is interesting in the context of research on risk and disaster
visualizations. FEMA and The Mid-America Earthquake Center, for example, have
invested heavily in Hazus and MAEviz respectively (FEMA 2008; MAE Center, 2006).
The rationale behind developing these programs is that they can help to visualize disaster
impacts and motivate organizations and people to act. The result of this study supports
this rationale. However, this study cannot say whether such programs are effective in
actually motivating organizations to adopt mitigation and preparedness activities because
this depends, among other factors on the design and implementation of the program. If
local agencies can design and implement such programs properly, they may be able to
motivate organizations to mitigate and prepare for disasters.
The significant positive relationship between organizational size and mitigation
and preparedness, suggests that governments at all levels should regard small businesses
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as a special group that may need specific incentives like tax breaks and subsidies to make
them adopt more mitigation and preparedness activities.

Policy Discussion
The results of the descriptive statistics do show that in general, Memphis/Shelby
County organizations discuss disaster issues in organizational meetings. The implication
for policy is that Memphis/Shelby County governments may be able to use organizational
meetings as outlet for disseminating disaster-related information and discussing disaster
issues with Memphis/Shelby County organizations. Structural mitigation is the mitigation
and preparedness activity Memphis/Shelby County organizations engaged in the least
over the past year. Policymakers can devise policies that could make it easier for
organizations to adopt structural mitigation measures. Policy intervention might include
incentives, such as tax breaks and subsidies for organizations that engage in structural
mitigation.
Limitations
This study has some limitations. First, this study may suffer from omitted variable
bias because of the omission of some independent variables relevant to mitigation and
preparedness. Independent variables left out of the analyses include past disaster
experience, age of the organization, and whether an organization leases or owns its
business property (Dahlhamer & D’Souza 1997; Mileti 1999). Second, the findings of
this study are perceptual. In other words, I really do not know what Memphis/Shelby
County organizations are actually doing to mitigate and prepare for disasters. If perceived
organizational actions regarding mitigation and preparedness are substantially different
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from the actual organizational actions, the reliability of my results may be threatened. My
hope is that the organizational representatives were able to give accurate information
about their organizations. Third, there were missing values on some of the variables that
prompted me to recode these variables. The recoded values are not the actual values of
the missing data. Fourth, adding mitigation and preparedness activities together implies
that each activity is equally weighted. This may not be a reasonable assumption. For
instance, it is not reasonable to expect that “Mentioning a potential disaster in an
organizational meeting” would require the same level of effort as “Engaging in structural
mitigation”. Fifth, respondent organizations may have inflated their responses regarding
disaster worry levels for earthquakes because the study in general may have given them
an indication that the research team was interested in earthquake issues. Lastly, I can only
say that this study is representative of the population concerning organizational size. I
cannot say whether this study is representative on unobservable characteristics, such as
the mitigation and preparedness activities adopted. All these limitations engender words
of caution in generalizing the results of this study.

Recommendations for Future Research
This study suggests several next steps in understanding the determinants of
organizational mitigation and preparedness. First, more research is needed to
understand why organizations mentioned that they engaged in an activity that seem to
require high effort (engaging in non-structural mitigation measures) over those that
require low effort (e.g., attending disaster meetings/training courses within the
organization). Second, it may interest the research community to investigate why
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organizations are not interested in adopting structural mitigation measures despite
substantial investment by the federal government in mitigation programs. Third, further
research in needed that can incorporate the independent variables that this study is
missing to understand fully the relevant determinants of mitigation and preparedness in
organizations. Fourth, it might interest some researchers to investigate the relative costs
and benefits of each of the mitigation and preparedness activities. Lastly, it might be
interesting to disaggregate some of the indices and take a closer look at each component
separately.
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